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Preface
This special issue contains the selected papers chosen by guest editors from the proceedings
of the 7th NATO RCMCIS 2005 Regional Conference on Military Communications and
Information Systems, Zegrze, Poland, 7–8 October 2005. The mission of the conference
is to provide forum to disseminate and to discuss important topics for the military. These
topics are currently investigated by the NATO research society and related to improvement of
the military infrastructure for communications and information systems (CIS). The leading
subject of the conference was Technologies for the Military Transformation. The majority of
about 60 presented papers were related to the above mentioned main topic and they discussed
the problems of the latest developments in systems and architectures, communication and
information systems technologies, secure communications interoperability protocols, as well
as cryptology.
Eight papers presented in this issue represent security and telecommunications technologies
areas as discussed during the conference. For the security matters there are four papers. The
ﬁrst, by Christoph Karg and Martin Lies presents A new approach to header compression
in secure communications. The authors propose a new header compression mechanism for
the IPv6 protocol; the main beneﬁt of the mechanism is a reduction of the overhead caused
by IPSec in the tunnel mode which enlarges the datagrams in order to provide security
services such as authentication and secrecy. The last two papers deal with the problems
corresponding to design of the cipher systems. In the paper Distrubution of the best nonzero
differential and linear approximations of s-box functions Krzysztof Chmiel discusses results
of the eﬀective designing of s-boxes for block ciphers; the author considers diﬀerential
and linear approximations of two classes of s-box functions. Anna Grocholewska-Czuryło
(Random generation of Boolean functions with high degree of correlation immunity) presents
an algorithm that can generate randomly highly nonlinear resilient functions for the use
mainly in stream cipher systems.
For the telecommunications technologies area there are ﬁve papers. The ﬁrst paper is End-
to-end service survivability under attacks on networks by Wojciech Molisz and Jacek Rak.
The authors propose a model based on traﬃc parameters of a demand, like delay or bit rate,
that allow establishing survivable attack-proof end-to-end connections. The next paper, New
model of identity checking in telecommunication digital channels by Piotr Gajewski, Jerzy
Łopatka and Zbigniew Piotrowski, describes a watermarking based technology system for
correspondent identity veriﬁcation in military telecommunication digital channels. Planning
the introduction of IPv6 in NATO by Robert Goode is devoted to the areas which must be
covered by the NATO IPv6 transition planning process in order to manage the introduction
and migration to IPv6. In the next paper (Simple admission control procedure for QoS
packed switched military networks) the authors, Damian Duda and Wojciech Burakowski,
propose an admission control method based on the online traﬃc load measurements and take
advantage from a possibility of the system over-provisioning. The ﬁnal paper (Performance
evaluation of the multiple output queueing switch with different buffer arrangements strategy
by Grzegorz Danilewicz, Wojciech Kabaciński, Janusz Kleban, Damian Parniewicz, and
Patryk Dąbrowski) deals with the problems of the switching system design.
Finally, we would like to take the opportunity to thank all authors of the presented papers as
well as the referees who helped us with the evaluation process.
Wojciech Burakowski and Janusz Stokłosa
Guest Editors
Paper A new approach to header
compression in secure communications
Christoph Karg and Martin Lies
Abstract—The paper presents a new header compression
mechanism for the IPv6 protocol. Its main benefit is the re-
duction of the overhead caused by IPSec tunnel mode which
enlarges datagrams in order to provide security services such
as authentication and secrecy.
Keywords—IPv6, header compression, IP security, restricted
bandwidth.
1. Introduction
In contrast to civil networks, tactical military computer net-
works lack the broad data rate links. This is especially true
for those tactical networks where the deployment is depen-
dent on a high mobility. Because of the necessity to utilize
wireless techniques or even open ISPs as transfer-nets, the
topic of security becomes ever more important. The cho-
sen security mechanism has to provide strong encryption
of the transported data regardless of the deployed applica-
tions, has to support an authentication mechanism to limit
the access and provide protection against a variety of at-
tacks. These requirements are fulfilled by IPSec [2], as well
as the need for a matching key exchange mechanism, the In-
ternet key exchange (IKE) [6]. With these components, the
communication of complete subnets can be secured using
IPSec gateways, building virtual private networks (VPNs).
In essence, every IP packet is completely encrypted in-
side another IP-packet, thereby hiding every information
about the application, the transmitted data and also about
the topology of the secured area.
The cost of the usage of IPSec tunnel mode is the growth
in the required data rate for the same amount of transmitted
data. To give an example, an Internet protocol Version 6
(IPv6) packet holds a header of 40 byte. IPSec tunnel
mode adds 40 byte IP-header for the transfer in the black,
i.e., unsecured network, then depending on the chosen au-
thentication algorithm around 22 bytes for the authentica-
tion header (AH) and again depending on the chosen en-
cryption algorithm another 22 bytes with a certain amount
of padding to obtain the necessary length. This still ignores
all application data.
Especially in narrow-bandwidth environments, e.g., com-
munication across HF, GSM or satellite, the overhead
caused by IPSec is not negligible. To enhance to perfor-
mance of IPSec, a header compression mechanism was de-
scribed in [5, 8]. The proposal resulted in the modification
of an existing IPSec implementation. The release supported
the following type of header compression. After a connec-
tion between two hosts inside two distinct secure subnets is
established, the black header is replaced by a small index
tag. Then the modified datagram is encrypted and encap-
sulated by the sending IPSec gateway. The receiving IPSec
machine verifies the mandatory authentication. On suc-
cess, it decrypts the payload and restores with the original
red IPv6 header by replacing the index tag. Comprehen-
sive tests substantiated the good performance of the header
compression approach. Alas the approach has an major
drawback. It is strictly link orientated and thus does not
work in a network topology consisting of various (i.e., more
than two) secure subnets.
This paper presents an enhancement of the above mech-
anism which works for arbitrary VPNs. It is developed
to work within the network resource manager (NRM) [7].
An NRM is a security gateway with extended functional-
ity. Besides enabling secure communications via IPSec, it
gathers information on the current network traffic. This sta-
tistical data can be used to estimate the available bandwidth
as well as the reliability of the existing connections. Fur-
thermore, the NRM supplies an enhanced connection man-
agement in order to support secure multicast-based group
communication and the corresponding key exchange mech-
anism (MIKE) as presented in [3].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the idea
behind the header compression mechanism is described.
The algorithms and data structures needed by header com-
pression are presented in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.
Section 5 provides information on how to integrate header
compression into the IPSec framework. The performance
of the compression mechanism is discussed in Section 6.
The paper closes with concluding remarks in Section 7.
2. Header compression
The IP tunneling mechanism (see Fig. 1a for details) is
an integral part of VPN solutions such as IPSec. A draw-
back is the enlarged datagram size, since two IP head-
ers must be transmitted. In order to decrease the packet
size, we propose to replace IP tunneling by an alterna-
tive header compression mechanism (see Fig. 1b). The idea
is as follows. The sending gateway replaces the inner IP
header by a compression header of smaller size. The com-
pression header contains among other an unique identifier.
This information enables the receiving gateway to recon-
struct the original IP header and forward the datagram
to its destination. The benefit comes from the fact that
the identifier can be used often while the assignment be-
tween IP and compression header must be transmitted only
a few times.
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Fig. 1. (a) IP tunneling: (1) Host A sends an IP packet to host B
via the gateways GA and GB, whereat the link between GA and GB
is an IP tunnel. (2) On receipt, GA stores the IP packet in a new
one. This mechanism offers several opportunities to manipulate
the IP packet to be tunneled. For example, IPSec encrypts the
packet before transmission. (3) GA sends the resulting packet
to GB. (4) GB unfolds the incoming packet, this is, it removes
the tunnel header and does some post-processing. For example,
IPSec decrypts the payload and checks it’t integrity. (5) Finally,
GB forwards the content to host B.
(b) Header compression: (1) Host A sends an IP packet to host B
via the gateways GA and GB. Instead of tunneling the packet di-
rectly, gateway GB performs the following manipulation. Based
on the IP header A→ B, GA computes an unique identifier idA→B.
(2) GA sends the pair (A→ B, idA→B) to gateway GB, which stores
the information in an internal lookup table. (3) GA replaces the
header A → B by the corresponding identifier idA→B and sends
the result to GB. This replacement is done for all following IP
packets with header A→ B. (4) On receipt, GB removes the tun-
nel header and the identifier. (5) GB uses idA→B to reconstruct the
original header A→ B. (6) GB combines A→ B with the payload.
(7) GB forwards the original IP packet to host B. If A sends an-
other datagram to B, then the same identifier can be used. Hence,
Step 3 can be omitted.
In the following we describe the header compression in
more detail. There are several questions to be discussed.
• How do we compute the compression header and the
identifier within?
• What is the structure of the header replacement?
• Which algorithms and data structures are required on
sender and receiver side?
• How is header compression integrated in the security
environment?
The following sections provide answers to these questions.
3. Computation of the compression
header
The reduction of the datagram size is achieved by the re-
placement of the original IP header by a smaller compres-
sion header. Its structure depends on the algorithm to be
used. There are two requirements to be met. Firstly, the in-
formation provided by compression header must be unique
such that the receiver can reconstruct the original header.
Secondly, the identifier should be usable for many different
IP headers so that the amount of assignment messages is
minimized.
A standard way to derive an unique identifier is universal
hashing with open addressing (see [4] for an excellent dis-
cussion of this topic). If the range of the hash function fits
into a 4-byte integer, there is a possibility of 232 simultane-
ous outgoing transmissions. If the hash function is chosen
uniformly at random then a good average case performance
is guaranteed.
To determine the input of the hash function, let’s take a look
on the structure of the IPv6 header depicted in Fig. 2.
The header size is 40 bytes. The largest part consists
of the source and destination address each with a size
of 16 bytes. Consider for a moment only datagrams sent
from the host A to the host B. In this case, the source and
destination address are constant. The contents of the fields
payload length, next header, and hop limit may change fre-
quently. The frequency of change of the contents stored
in the fields traffic class and flow label is difficult to esti-
mate. It depends on the quality of service features of the
underlying network. As a rule of thumb, we assume a low
modification rate.
Based on the above assumption, the fields version, flow la-
bel, traffic class, source address and destination address are
the input of the hash function. With other words, the hash
function maps 32 bytes to values of 4 byte length. Open
addressing guarantees unique hash keys given the num-
ber of different inputs is smaller than the range (i.e., 232).
Since the payload length, hop limit and next header en-
tries do not influence the outcome of the hash func-
tion, they additionally must be stored in the compression
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Fig. 2. Format of the IPv6 header.
header. This leads to the following structure of the
compression header:
1) hash key to determine version, flow label, traffic
class, source address and destination address;
2) payload length;
3) next header;
4) hop limit.
The size of the compression header is 8 bytes. Hence, it’s
size is 20% of the IP header.
Additional costs arise from the fact that the assignment
between hash key and according IP header parts must be
transmitted to the receiving gateways. The cost in terms of
data rate depends on the way, the assignment information
is distributed. Among others, two following methods are
conceivable.
• If the compression starts, the first datagrams are not
compressed. Instead, they are extended with an op-
tional header which contains the hash key. On re-
ceipt, the destination gateway stores this identifier
together with the associated parts of the IP header.
On this way, it learns how to decompress future data-
grams.
• In the beginning of compression, the first datagrams
are transmitted without modification. Additionally,
the assignment information is sent in a separate data-
gram.
Note, the transmission of the compression information is
critical for the whole communication. Hence, the spread of
the assignment information must be redundant to guarantee
that the destination gateway gets the assignment before the
compressed data.
The computation of the index is strictly sender oriented.
This is, the sending gateway computes the identifiers of all
outgoing datagrams independently on it’s own. As an ad-
vantage, the gateways do not need to coordinate the iden-
tifier creation. This keeps things simple and there is no
additional communication between the gateways required.
Furthermore, compression header assignment messages are
receivable even by those gateways which are in emission
control (emcon) condition.
4. Data structures
The mapping between identifiers and according IP header
fragments must be stored in an appropriate data structure.
The requirement to be met is the fast lookup of a given
index. The best performance is achieved by an hash table.
However this is not feasible because of the large range of the
deployed hash function and its many memory consumption.
A good compromise between space and performance is the
usage of a balanced search tree such as red-black trees [4].
Such a data structure guarantees time 0(log2 n) for search,
insertion and deletion where n is the number of elements
stored in the tree.
In order to compress a datagram the sending gateway acts
as follows. It computes the hash index of the IP header
fragment. Then, it replaces the header by the compression
header. If it is the first time, that this header fragment is
compressed, then the assignment information is sent the
receiving gateway. Additionally, the pair consisting of index
and header fragment is stored in the search tree.
On the receiving side, the data keeping is slightly different.
Since the identifier is correlated with the gateway which
created it, the receiver must manage a search tree for each
sending gateway. These trees are stored in another search
tree with the senders’ IP addresses as key.
The contents of the search trees change dynamically. An
entry may be deleted if the respective hash index was not
used for a certain time. This behavior increases the perfor-
mance of both running time and memory usage.
5. Integration into security services
The header compression mechanism is thought to be used
in combination with a secure transmission method. An ob-
vious approach is the IP security protocol suite [2]. Partic-
ularly, the compressed datagrams are sent via IPSec trans-
port mode. The usage of IPSec has the advantage of well-
developed administrative tools such as automated key ne-
gotiation. However, the header compression must be inte-
grated in the IPSec processing chain. There are two possi-
ble solutions. The first one is the extension of the operating
system’s kernel. The second one consists in the packet fil-
tering and manipulation in user space via the TUN/TAP
interface.
The integration of header compression into the operating
system results in optimal performance since the code runs
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in kernel space. However for modification of the kernel
the underlying source code is required. Even if the code
is available, the compression algorithm must be adapted to
the respective conditions of the operating system. Hence,
the work is not portable to other operating systems. An-
other drawback is the large amount of maintenance re-
quired to keep the software up to date with new kernel
releases.
The second approach uses the TUN/TAP interface for
packet manipulation. TUN/TAP is a standardized mech-
anism for manipulation of IP packets and Ethernet frames.
It is supported by major UNIX systems such as BSD, Linux
and Solaris and even by Windows XP. Hence, the code of
the header compression extension is portable between the
different operating systems with moderate effort. A poten-
tial disadvantage is a loss in performance since the com-
pression runs in user space and has to share the system’s
resources with the other processes.
Finally, we remark that IPSec is not the only way to de-
ploy header compression. An alternative is OpenVPN [1],
a VPN solution which uses the SSL/TLS protocol for
a secure data tunneling. Compared to IPSec, OpenVPN
is a lightweight VPN solution. It can be set up easily.
Additionally, OpenVPN provides a traffic shaping function-
ality to restrict the rate of data flowing to the tunnel.
6. Performance estimates
To evaluate the performance of the header compression
mechanism, two aspects have to be considered:
• Network delay. The compression of the IP header is
an additional processing step in the data flow which
increases the delay between sending and receiving
host.
• Data rate improvement. Header compression is de-
ployed with the goal of reducing the amount of data
to be transmitted. Hence, this criterion has to ana-
lyzed.
The influence on the network delay can be estimated by the
amount of time needed to compute the compression header.
The expensive part is the lookup of the hash index in the
balanced search tree.
A well-known result concerning universal hashing is the
following [4]. If the hash function h is randomly chosen
from a universal collection of hash functions and is used
to hash n keys into a table of size m, where m ≤ n, the
expected number of collisions involving a particular key is
less than 1. Hence, if the outgoing connections result in
n different hash indices, where n ≤ 232, then there are no
collisions in the average case. Since the keys are stored
in a balanced tree, the expected running time per lookup
operation is logarithmic in n.
What does this mean in practice? Assume, that the search
tree is based on red-black trees. Then a tree storing n hash
indices as height at most 2log2(n + 1). This value is an
upper bound for the cost of a lookup operation. Each entry
consists of at least 40 bytes (4 bytes for the index and 36
for the IP header fragment). This is a lower bound for
the memory needed to store the search tree. If any host in
the subnet has 10000 concurrent outgoing data connections
then the number of different hash indices is at most 10000.
Given the total number n of hosts, the upper bound of
different indices is 10000n. Using this bound, we estimate
the size of the tree for concrete values for n (Table 1).
Table 1
Tree size estimations
Hosts Indices Tree height Size [MB]
10 100000 34 3.815
20 200000 36 7.629
50 500000 38 19.073
100 1000000 40 38.147
200 2000000 42 76.294
500 5000000 45 190.735
Because the number of steps to compute a table lookup is
small even for a large number of hosts, the delay caused
by header compression is negligible on modern computer
hardware.
Fig. 3. The topology of a tactical military network at batallion
level.
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The improvement of the data rate is quite difficult to esti-
mate. It depends on both the topology of the underlying
network and the type of traffic and its distribution within
the network. The topology can be created based on exist-
ing military tactical networks. For an example, we refer
to Fig. 3. The determination of network traffic structure in
terms of distribution and service type is a difficult or even
impossible venture.
A promising approach consists in a statistical analysis via
a network simulation which is beyond the scope of this
paper. As an obvious rule of thumb, the gain of header
compression is high for network services which send data-
grams in an high frequency. A good example is voice
over IP (VoIP).
7. Conclusions and future work
This paper presents a new approach to header compression
to be used in combination with the IP security framework.
The benefit is a reduction of the overhead caused by IPSec
tunnel mode in terms of enlarged datagrams. Furthermore,
it can be integrated in common existing operating systems
with moderate effort. Currently the header compression is
a concept. Future steps are simulations based on network
simulator 2 and the implementation in a testing environ-
ment.
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Paper Distribution of the best nonzero
differential and linear approximations
of s-box functions
Krzysztof Chmiel
Abstract— In the paper the differential and the linear ap-
proximations of two classes of s-box functions are considered.
The classes are the permutations and arbitrary functions with
n binary inputs and m binary outputs, where 1≤ n = m≤ 10.
For randomly chosen functions from each of the classes, the
two-dimensional distributions of the best nonzero approxima-
tions are investigated. The obtained results indicate that start-
ing from some value of n, the linear approximation of s-box
functions becomes more effective than the differential approxi-
mation. This advantage of the linear approximation rises with
the increase of n and for DES size s-boxes is not yet visible.
Keywords— differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, sub-
stitution boxes.
1. Introduction
Diﬀerential and linear cryptanalysis belong to main top-
ics in cryptology since they were introduced and suc-
cessfully applied to the data encryption standard (DES).
Unlike the diﬀerential cryptanalysis, which is essentially
a chosen-plaintext attack [1, 10, 11], the linear cryptanaly-
sis is essentially a known-plaintext attack and moreover is
applicable to an only-ciphertext attack under some circum-
stances [2–12].
The basic idea of diﬀerential cryptanalysis is to analyze
the eﬀect of particular diﬀerences in plaintext pairs on
the diﬀerences of the resultant ciphertext pairs. The dif-
ferences are usually calculated as a result of XOR oper-
ation. Input XOR of a cipher algorithm causes a speci-
ﬁed output XOR with some probability. The appropriate,
approximate expression will be called the diﬀerential ap-
proximation. By the differential approximation of function
Y = f (X) : {0,1}n →{0,1}m we mean an arbitrary equation
of the form:
f (X)⊕ f (X ⊕X ′) = Y ′ ,
which is fulﬁlled with approximation probability p =
N(X ′,Y ′)/2n, where X ′∈{0, . . . ,2n−1},Y ′∈{0, . . . ,2m−1}
and N(X ′, Y ′) denotes the number of input pairs (X , X⊕X ′)
for which the equation holds. The numbers X ′, Y ′ are called
input and output difference respectively and the function
N(X ′,Y ′) is called the counting function of the approxima-
tion. The magnitude of p represents the effectiveness of
the approximation. Among approximations we distinguish
the zero differential approximation with X ′ =Y ′ = 0, which
probability p is equal to 1 for arbitrary function f .
The basic idea of linear cryptanalysis is to describe a given
cipher algorithm by a linear approximate expression, so-
called linear approximation. In general, the linear approxi-
mation of function Y = f (X) : {0,1}n →{0,1}m is deﬁned
as an arbitrary equation of the form:
⊕
i∈Y ′
yi = ⊕
j∈X ′
x j ,
which is fulﬁlled with approximation probability p =
N(X ′,Y ′)/2n, where X ′ ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}, Y ′ ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} and
N(X ′,Y ′) denotes the number of pairs (X ,Y ) for which the
equation holds. The sets of indexes X ′,Y ′ are called input
and output mask respectively and the function N(X ′,Y ′)
is called the counting function of the approximation. The
effectiveness of the approximation is represented by magni-
tude of |∆p|= |p−1/2|. By the zero linear approximation
we mean approximation with X ′ = Y ′ = Φ, which probabil-
ity p is equal to 1 for arbitrary function f . Masks X ′,Y ′ are
often denoted by numbers, corresponding to the zero-one
representation of sets.
The set of all diﬀerential approximations of function f can
be described in the form of the approximation table T D f ,
called in [1] the difference distribution table. The element
T D f [X ′,Y ′] of the table, is deﬁned as follows:
T D f [X ′,Y ′] = N(X ′,Y ′) .
The maximum value of T D f , that corresponds to the best,
i.e., most eﬀective, nonzero diﬀerential approximation, is
denoted by maxT D and is deﬁned by formula:
maxT D = max{T D f [X ′,Y ′] : X ′ 6= 0∨Y ′ 6= 0} .
Similarly, the set of all linear approximations of function f
is represented in the form of the approximation table TA f .
The element TA f [X ′,Y ′] of the table, is deﬁned as follows:
TA f [X ′,Y ′] = ∆N(X ′,Y ′) = N(X ′,Y ′)−2n−1 .
The maximum absolute value of TA f , which corresponds
to the best nonzero linear approximation, is denoted by
maxTA and is deﬁned in the following way:
maxTA = max {|TA f [X ′,Y ′]| : X ′ 6= Φ∨Y ′ 6= Φ} .
The approximation tables of an example function f are
presented in Table 1. There exist many eﬀective approx-
imations of the function, identiﬁed by nonzero values of
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Table 1
Function f and its approximation tables T D f and TA f
(n = 4, m = 2)
f T D f TA f
X Y = f (X) X ′ Y ′ X ′ Y ′
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 3 0 16 0 0 0 0 8 –2 –1 1
1 3 1 10 0 2 4 1 0 –2 1 –1
2 3 2 6 0 2 8 2 0 0 1 1
3 0 3 6 0 2 8 3 0 0 3 –1
4 1 4 2 8 6 0 4 0 0 –1 7
5 3 5 2 8 6 0 5 0 0 –3 1
6 1 6 0 2 12 2 6 0 2 1 –1
7 1 7 2 4 10 0 7 0 2 –1 1
8 0 8 4 2 0 10 8 0 –4 1 1
9 0 9 2 0 2 12 9 0 0 –1 –1
10 3 10 8 2 0 6 10 0 –2 –5 1
11 3 11 8 2 0 6 11 0 2 1 –1
12 1 12 0 6 8 2 12 0 2 –3 –1
13 2 13 0 6 8 2 13 0 –2 –1 1
14 2 14 2 8 6 0 14 0 –4 –1 –1
15 2 15 2 12 2 0 15 0 0 1 1
the tables. The best nonzero diﬀerential approximations
have maxT D = 12 and probability p = 12/16, while the
best nonzero linear approximation has maxTA = 7 and
probability |∆p|= 7/16.
The size of the approximation tables T D f and TA f of func-
tion f is equal to 2n+m and the basic algorithms compute
a single element of the tables in exponential time. The
used in the investigation fast algorithms, presented in de-
tail in [10], compute the approximation tables in time at
worst linear for a single element, without memory needed
for storage of the whole table.
2. Results
The presented in this chapter results of experiments concern
the distribution of the best nonzero diﬀerential and linear
approximations of two classes of s-box functions Y = f (X).
The classes are the permutations and arbitrary functions
of the type f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m, for 1 ≤ n = m ≤ 10.
For each value of n, the investigation was carried out for
1000 randomly chosen functions from the class. For each
function, with use of the mentioned in the previous chap-
ter fast algorithms, were calculated values of maxT D and
maxTA. Distribution of pairs (maxT D,maxTA) was the
goal of the computation. The obtained results are presented
in Figs. 1–19.
For n = m = 1 (Fig. 1), the proportional distributions ob-
tained for permutations and arbitrary functions are identi-
cal. For 100% of functions, from each of the classes, the
obtained pair (maxT D,maxTA) is equal to (2, 1).
Fig. 1. Distribution for permutations and arbitrary functions
(n = 1, m = 1).
For n = m = 2 (Figs. 2 and 3), the distributions for per-
mutations and arbitrary functions diﬀer. For 100% of
permutations, the obtained pair (maxT D,maxTA) is equal
Fig. 2. Proportional distribution for permutations (n = 2, m = 2).
Fig. 3. Proportional distribution for arbitrary functions (n = 2,
m = 2).
to (4, 2). For arbitrary functions, the same pair (4, 2) is ob-
tained for 26.4% of functions while for remaining 73.6% of
functions is obtained pair (2, 2). The results indicate, that
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resistance to linear approximation of permutations and ar-
bitrary functions with two input and output bits is the same,
while about 3/4 of arbitrary functions are more resistant to
diﬀerential approximation than permutations.
Fig. 4. Proportional distribution for permutations (n = 3, m = 3).
Fig. 5. Proportional distribution for arbitrary functions (n = 3,
m = 3).
For n = m = 3 (Figs. 4 and 5), three diﬀerent pairs
(maxT D,maxTA) are obtained for permutations while for
arbitrary functions are obtained ﬁve diﬀerent pairs, among
which two pairs are dominant. Among permutations there
are more functions with pair (8, 4) that are easiest to ap-
proximate as well as more functions with pair (2, 2) that are
most diﬃcult to approximate, than among arbitrary func-
tions. It should be noticed, that for permutations the values
of maxTA are even while for arbitrary functions are odd as
well. The values of maxT D are even both for permutations
and arbitrary functions.
For n = m = 4 (Figs. 6 and 7), there exist for permutations
two dominant pairs and for arbitrary functions also two,
but not the same. Both distributions have the evident max-
imum, which is obtained for the pair (maxT D,maxTA)
equal to (6, 6).
For n = m = 5 (Figs. 8 and 9), there are visible bars in the
diagrams for the values of maxT D equal to 6, 8 and 10.
Fig. 6. Proportional distribution for permutations (n = 4, m = 4).
Fig. 7. Proportional distribution for arbitrary functions (n = 4,
m = 4).
Fig. 8. Proportional distribution for permutations (n = 5, m = 5).
The maximum of distribution is less for arbitrary functions,
because of the even and odd values of maxTA.
For n = m = 6 (Figs. 10 and 11), there are visible in the
distributions for permutations and arbitrary functions, two
signiﬁcant series of results for maxT D equal to 8 and 10.
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Fig. 9. Proportional distribution for arbitrary functions (n = 5,
m = 5).
Fig. 10. Proportional distribution for permutations (n = 6, m = 6).
Fig. 11. Proportional distribution for arbitrary functions (n = 6,
m = 6).
For n = m = 7 (Figs. 12 and 13), there are visible three
series of results for maxT D equal to 8, 10 and 12, in the
distributions for permutations and arbitrary functions. The
middle series is clearly dominant.
For n = m = 8 (Figs. 14 and 15), there are visible in the
distributions for permutations and arbitrary functions, two
signiﬁcant series of results for maxT D equal to 10 and 12.
The series are rather equivalent this time. No one of them
dominates.
For n = m = 9 (Figs. 16 and 17), in the distributions for
permutations and arbitrary functions, are visible two series
Fig. 12. Proportional distribution for permutations (n = 7, m = 7).
Fig. 13. Proportional distribution for arbitrary functions (n = 7,
m = 7).
Fig. 14. Proportional distribution for permutations (n = 8, m = 8).
Fig. 15. Proportional distribution for arbitrary functions (n = 8,
m = 8).
of results for maxT D equal to 12 and 14. The series for
maxT D equal to 12 is clearly dominant.
For n = m = 10 (Figs. 18 and 19), there are visible two
signiﬁcant series of results for maxT D equal to 12 and 14,
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Fig. 16. Proportional distribution for permutations (n = 9, m = 9).
Fig. 17. Proportional distribution for arbitrary functions (n = 9,
m = 9).
in the distributions for permutations and arbitrary functions.
The series for value 14 of maxT D is not so dominant like
in the case of n = m = 9.
Considering the results for 1 ≤ n = m ≤ 10, presented in
Figs. 1–19 we can observe, that the signiﬁcant for distribu-
tions ranges of maxT D and maxTA as well as the values
of pairs (maxT D,maxTA) for which are obtained maxima
Fig. 18. Proportional distribution for permutations (n = 10,
m = 10).
Fig. 19. Proportional distribution for arbitrary functions (n = 10,
m = 10).
of distributions, are about the same for permutations and
arbitrary functions. The values of maxima are greater for
permutations. It follows from the fact, that for n ≥ 3, the
values of maxTA are even for permutations while for arbi-
trary functions are odd as well. Thus, we can say that the
results obtained for permutations and arbitrary functions
are similar.
Comparing the diﬀerential and the linear approximation we
can observe, that the ranges of maxT D are narrow while
the ranges of maxTA are wide. With the increase of n = m
the values of maxTA rise much faster than the values of
maxT D. It means that the linear approximation of s-box
functions becomes much more eﬀective than the diﬀerential
approximation. This advantage of the linear approximation
starts at some value of n = m and rises with the increase
of this value.
3. Results for DES size s-boxes
The presented in this chapter results concern the distribu-
tion of the best nonzero diﬀerential and linear approxima-
tions of permutations with 6 input bits and 4 output bits.
Similarly to deﬁnition of DES s-boxes, by permutation in
this case we mean a set of four 4-bit permutations. In gen-
eral, for n > m, by permutation we mean in fact a set of
2n−m m-bit permutations. The results in detail are presented
in Table 2 and illustrated in Fig. 20.
Table 2
Results of experiments for permutations – DES size
(n = 6, m = 4)
maxT D maxTA Total
10 12 14 16 18
12 0 6 5 3 0 14
14 1 144 141 33 4 323
16 1 107 255 65 12 440
18 0 24 94 41 5 164
20 0 3 28 14 2 47
22 0 3 3 4 1 11
24 0 0 0 0 1 1
Total 2 287 526 160 25 1000
For DES size s-boxes, the advantage of the linear approxi-
mation over the diﬀerential one is not yet visible. The range
of maxT D is from 12 to 24 and the range of maxTA is
from 10 to 18. So the values of maxT D and maxTA are
comparable.
The distribution of the best nonzero approximations enables
to evaluate the quality of constructed s-boxes. The less the
values of maxT D and maxTA the better is the s-box. The
quality of DES s-boxes S1–S8 is presented in Table 3. The
value of maxT D for all s-boxes is equal to 16. The best
s-box of DES is S6 with maxTA = 14 and the worst is S5
with maxTA = 20.
It follows from Table 2, that for 25.5% of randomly se-
lected s-boxes, the obtained pair (maxT D, maxTA) is equal
to (16, 14). Thus, parameters of s-box S6 correspond to
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Fig. 20. Proportional distribution for permutations – DES size
(n = 6, m = 4).
Table 3
Quality of DES s-boxes S1-S8
maxT D maxTA
10 12 14 16 18 20
12
14
16 S6 S2 S1 S5
S3 S7
S4
S8
the maximum of the distribution. There are 40.5% of
s-boxes with parameters better than of s-box S6. We have
obtained, that among three randomly selected s-boxes, two
of them are not worse than the best s-box of DES S6 and
one of them is better. On the other hand, the value 20 of
maxTA of the worst s-box S5, was not obtained for any of
the 1000 randomly selected s-boxes. The quality of DES
s-boxes is obviously not the best possible one.
4. Conclusion
The basic algorithms to compute a single element of the
approximation tables T D f and TA f are of exponential com-
plexity. The presented in [10] fast algorithms compute the
values of maxT D and maxTA in at worst linear time for
a single element, without memory needed for storage of the
whole table. The fast algorithms were used to calculate the
distribution of pairs (maxT D, maxTA) for randomly cho-
sen permutations and arbitrary functions with n binary in-
puts and m binary outputs, where 1≤ n = m≤ 10. For both
classes of functions, the obtained results were similar. The
main conclusion is that starting from some value of n, lin-
ear approximation of s-box functions becomes much more
eﬀective than diﬀerential approximation. Moreover, this
advantage of linear approximation rises with the increase
of n and for DES size s-boxes is not yet visible.
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Paper Random generation
of Boolean functions with high degree
of correlation immunity
Anna Grocholewska-Czuryło
Abstract—In recent years a cryptographic community is pay-
ing a lot of attention to the constructions of so called resilient
functions for use mainly in stream cipher systems. Very little
work however has been devoted to random generation of such
functions. This paper tries to fill that gap and presents an al-
gorithm that can generate at random highly nonlinear resilient
functions. Generated functions are analyzed and compared
to the results obtained from the best know constructions and
some upper bounds on nonlinearity and resiliency. It is shown
that randomly generated functions achieve in most cases re-
sults equal to the best known designs, while in other cases fall
just behind such constructs. It is argued that the algorithm
can perhaps be used to prove the existence of some resilient
functions for which no mathematical prove has been given
so far.
Keywords—cryptography, ciphers, Boolean functions, correla-
tion immunity, reslilience, random generation.
1. Introduction
Boolean functions play an important role in virtually any
modern cryptographic system – be it block or stream ci-
phers, private or public key systems, authentication al-
gorithms, etc. As security of these systems relies on
Boolean functions these functions should posses some
speciﬁc criteria that would protect a cryptographic sys-
tem from any existing cryptanalytic attacks, and preferably
make it also immune against any attacks that might be de-
signed in the future. These criteria are called cryptographic
criteria.
It is widely accepted among cryptologists that most impor-
tant criteria are balancedness, high nonlinearity, propaga-
tion criteria, correlation immunity, high algebraic degree.
Unfortunately no Boolean function exists that would fulﬁl
all of these criteria to the maximum, so ﬁnding a crypto-
graphically strong Boolean functions is always a trade-oﬀ
between these criteria and is not a trivial task.
In particular, a functions whose output leaks no information
about its input values is of great importance. Such func-
tions are called correlation immune Boolean functions and
were introduced by T. Siegenthaler in 1984 [32] and ever
since then have been a topic of active research. A balanced
correlation immune function is called a resilient function.
As balancedness is one criterion that should be fulﬁlled
under any circumstances, resilience is a criterion most of-
ten mentioned in the scientiﬁc literature when one talks
about correlation immunity.
Most of the cryptographic criteria is in one way or another
related to nonlinearity of the Boolean function. Highest
nonlinearity is very desirable so most of the research con-
centrates on fulﬁlling the cryptographic criteria while main-
taining a highest possible nonlinearity, which very often
(virtually always) has to be sacriﬁced to some extent.
The approach to ﬁnding a good cryptographic functions
is most often based on speciﬁc algebraic constructions of
Boolean functions with desirable properties – like highly
nonlinear Boolean function with high order of resiliency.
Or constructing bent functions (functions with highest pos-
sible nonlinearity) and then modifying them to fulﬁl other
cryptographic criteria.
In the article the author argues that the use of randomly cho-
sen Boolean functions with good cryptographic properties
(if we are able to ﬁnd such functions) is probably better
than the use of functions with similar parameters which
are obtained by explicit constructions. The main reason is
that explicit constructions usually lead to functions which
have very particular (algebraic or combinatorial) structures,
which may induce weaknesses regarding existing or future
attacks. Therefore, author considered ﬁnding and studying
randomly generated Boolean functions (at least with a few
inputs and outputs) with good cryptographic properties, to
be of high interest.
Based on a algorithm designed by the author which can
generate highly nonlinear functions at random, some com-
parative results are presented that give an insight to diﬀer-
ences between constructed and generated Boolean function
with good cryptographic properties.
Particular emphasis of the paper is on resiliency of highly
nonlinear functions. The random generation algorithm man-
ages to output balanced functions which in some cases have
the highest achievable nonlinearity for a particular number
of variables and/or have higher nonlinearity then some of
the modern methods for obtaining cryptographically strong
Boolean functions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some
basic deﬁnitions and notations that are used throughout the
remainder of the article. In Section 3 a random function
generator is described, which is used as a foundation for
obtaining highly nonlinear resilient functions. Experimen-
tal results and comparisons to other research are given in
Section 4. Then conclusions follow in Section 5.
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2. Preliminaries
We use square brackets to denote vectors like [a1, . . . ,an]
and round brackets to denote functions like f (x1, . . . ,xn).
2.1. Boolean function
Let GF(2) = 〈∑,⊕,•〉 be two-element Galois ﬁeld, where
∑ = {0,1}, ⊕ and • denotes the sum and multiplication
mod 2, respectively. A function f : ∑n 7→ ∑ is an n-ar-
gument Boolean function. Let z = x1 · 2n−1 + x2 · 2n−2 +
. . . + xn · 20 be the decimal representation of argu-
ments (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) of the function f . Let us denote
f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) as yz. Then [y0,y1, . . . ,y2n−1] is called
a truth table of the function f .
2.2. Linear and nonlinear Boolean functions
An n-argument Boolean function f is linear if it can
be represented in the following form: f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) =
a1x1 ⊕ a2x2 ⊕ . . .⊕ anxn. Let Ln be a set of all n-ar-
gument linear Boolean functions. Let Mn = {g : ∑n 7→
∑ | g(x1,x2, . . . ,xn) = 1 ⊕ f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) and f ∈ Ln}.
A set An = Ln ∪Mn is called a set of n-argument aﬃne
Boolean functions. A Boolean function f : ∑n 7→ ∑ that is
not aﬃne is called a nonlinear Boolean function.
2.3. Balance
Let N0[y0,y1, . . . ,y2n−1] be a number of zeros (0’s)
in the truth table [y0,y1, . . . ,y2n−1] of function f , and
N1[y0,y1, . . . ,y2n−1] be a number of ones (1’s). A Boolean
function is balanced if
N0[y0,y1, . . . ,y2n−1] = N1[y0,y1, . . . ,y2n−1] .
2.4. Algebraic normal form
A Boolean function can also be represented as a maxi-
mum of 2n coeﬃcients of the algebraic normal form (ANF).
These coeﬃcients provide a formula for the evaluation of
the function for any given input x = [x1,x2, . . . ,xn]:
f (x) = a0⊕
n
∑
i=1
aixi⊕ ∑
1≤i< j≤n
ai jxix j ⊕ . . .⊕a12...nx1x2 . . .xn ,
where ∑, ⊕ denote modulo 2 summation.
The order of nonlinearity of a Boolean function f (x)
is a maximum number of variables in a product term
with non-zero coeﬃcient aJ , where J is a subset of
{1,2,3, . . . ,n}. In the case where J is an empty set the
coeﬃcient is denoted as a0 and is called a zero order coeﬃ-
cient. Coeﬃcients of order 1 are a1,a2, . . . ,an, coeﬃcients
of order 2 are a12,a13, . . . ,a(n−1)n, coeﬃcient of order n
is a12...n. The number of all ANF coeﬃcients equals 2n.
Let us denote the number of all (zero and non-zero) coef-
ﬁcients of order i of function f as σi( f ). For n-argument
function f there are as many coeﬃcients of a given or-
der as there are i-element combinations in n-element set,
i.e., σi( f ) =
(
n
i
)
.
2.5. Hamming distance
Hamming weight of a binary vector x ∈ ∑n, denoted as
hwt(x), is the number of ones in that vector.
Hamming distance between two Boolean functions f ,g :
∑n 7→ ∑ is denoted by d( f ,g) and is deﬁned as follows:
d( f ,g) = ∑
x∈∑n
f (x)⊕g(x) .
The distance of a Boolean function f from a set of n-ar-
gument Boolean functions Xn is deﬁned as follows:
δ ( f ) = min
g∈Xn
d( f ,g) ,
where d( f ,g) is the Hamming distance between functions f
and g. The distance of a function f a set of aﬃne func-
tions An is the distance of function f from the nearest func-
tion g ∈ An.
The distance of function f from a set of all aﬃne func-
tions is called the nonlinearity of function f and is denoted
by N f .
2.6. Bent functions
A Boolean function f : ∑n 7→∑ is perfectly nonlinear if and
only if f (x)⊕ f (x⊕α) is balanced for any α ∈ ∑n such
that 1 ≤ hwt(α)≤ n.
For a perfectly nonlinear Boolean function, any change of
inputs causes the change of the output with probability
of 0.5.
Meier and Staﬀelbach [24] proved that the set of per-
fectly nonlinear Boolean functions is the same as the set of
Boolean bent functions deﬁned by Rothaus [29].
Perfectly nonlinear functions (or bent functions) have the
same, and the maximum possible distance to all aﬃne func-
tions.
Bent functions are not balanced. Hamming weight of a bent
function equals 2n−1±2 n2−1.
2.7. Walsh transform
Let x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) and ω = (ω1,ω2, . . . ,ωn) both be-
long to {0,1}n and x•ω = x1ω1,x2ω2, . . . ,xnωn. Let f (x)
be a Boolean functions on n variables. Then the Walsh
transform of f (x) is a real valued function over {0,1}n that
can be deﬁned as:
Wf (ω) = ∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1) f (x)⊕xω .
The Walsh transform is sometimes called the spectral dis-
tribution or simply the spectra of a Boolean function. It is
an important tool for the analysis of Boolean function.
2.8. Correlation immunity and resilience
Guo-Zhen and Massey [13] have provided a spectral char-
acterisation of correlation immune functions using Walsh
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transform. We can use that as a deﬁnition of correlation
immunity:
A function f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is m-order correlation im-
mune (CI) iﬀ its Walsh transform Wf satisﬁes Wf = 0,
for 1 ≤ hwt(ω) ≤ m. Note that balanced m-order corre-
lation immune functions are called m-resilient functions
and if f is balanced then Wf (0) = 0. Thus, a function
f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) is m-resilient iﬀ its Walsh transform W f
satisﬁes Wf (ω) = 0, for 0 ≤ hwt(ω)≤ m.
By an (n,m,d,x) function we mean an n-variable, m-re-
silient (balanced m-order CI) function with degree d and
nonlinearity x. In the above notation the degree component
is replaced by a ’-’ (i.e., (n,m,−,x)), if we do not want to
specify a degree.
3. Random generation of highly
nonlinear functions
As already mentioned earlier, so called bent Boolean
functions achieve the highest possible nonlinearity. There
exist a number of algorithms for constructing bent
Boolean functions. Such constructions have been given by
Rothaus [29], Kam and Davida [15], Maiorana [17],
Adams and Tavares [1], and others.
Most of the known bent function constructions take bent
functions of n arguments as their input and generate bent
functions of n+2 arguments. One major drawback of these
methods is the fact that they are deterministic. Only short
bent functions (n = 4 or 6) are selected at random and the
resulting function is obtained using the same, deterministic
formula every time. The possible drawback of such ap-
proach (constructions) were stated in the beginning of this
paper.
Drawing bent functions at random is not feasible already
for small number of arguments (n > 6). To make such
generation possible, an algorithm was designed that gen-
erates random Boolean functions in algebraic normal form
thus making use of some basic properties of bent functions
to considerably narrow the search space. This makes the
generation of bent functions feasible for n > 6.
The algorithm for the generation of bent functions in ANF
domain takes as its input the minimum and maximum num-
ber of ANF coeﬃcients of every order that the resulting
functions are allowed to have. Since the nonlinear order
of bent functions is less or equal to n/2, clearly in ANF
of a bent function can not be any ANF coeﬃcient of order
higher then n/2. This restriction is the major reason for
random generation feasibility, since it considerably reduces
the possible search space.
However the fact that bent functions are not balanced pro-
hibits their direct application in the cipher system. Still, as
bent functions achieve maximum possible nonlinearity they
are often used as a foundation for constructing highly non-
linear balanced functions. In recent years some methods
have been proposed that transform bent functions to bal-
anced Boolean functions with minimal loss in nonlinearity.
Examples of such methods are given in [18] and [19]. Still,
balancing bent function can lead to low order of resiliency.
In a quest for a randomly generated, highly nonlinear func-
tion with higher order resiliency the above mentioned ran-
dom bent function generation algorithm has been modiﬁed
to generate such functions. Here again some speciﬁc prop-
erties of resilient functions are crucial.
As already stated there are certain trade-oﬀs involved
among the parameters of a cryptographically sound
Boolean function. As it has been showed by Siegen-
thaler [32] for an n-variable function, of degree d and order
of correlation immunity m the following holds: m+d ≤ n.
Further, if the function is balanced then m+d ≤ n−1.
The generating algorithm is used basically in the same way
as when generating bent functions. Still it operates in the
ANF domain and it takes as its input the number mini-
mal and maximal number of coeﬃcients of every order.
Nonlinear order is restricted according to Siegenthalter’s
ﬁndings and some more precise upper bounds on resilient
order given by Sarkar and Maitra in [30].
Sarkar and Maitra in [30] present some construction meth-
ods for highly nonlinear resilient functions and give upper
bounds on nonlinearity of resilient functions.
For the sake of completeness a Maiorana-McFarland like
construction technique will now be brieﬂy discussed. This
technique is perhaps the most important of all resilient
Boolean functions construction methods and has been in-
vestigated in a number of papers [2, 3, 5, 31]. This con-
struction has been used by Maitra and Sarkar as a basis for
their work.
Let pi be a map from {0,1}r to {0,1}k, where for any
x ∈ {0,1}r, hwt(pi(x)) ≥ m + 1. Let f : {0,1}r+k 7→ {0,1}
be a Boolean function deﬁned as f (x,y) = y•pi(x)⊕g(x),
where x∈ {0,1}r, y∈ {0,1}k and y•pi(x) is the inner prod-
uct of y and pi(x). Then f is m-resilient.
Table 1
Upper bounds on nonlinearity of resilient functions
5 6 7 8 9 10
1 12 24 56 116* 244* 492*
2 8 24 56* 112 240 480
3 0 16 48 112 240* 480
4 0 32 96 224 480*
5 0 64 192 448
6 0 128 384
7 0 256
8 0
Table 1 summarises the results obtained in [30] and gives
upper bounds on nonlinearity of resilient functions for num-
ber of arguments ranging from 5 to 10. The rows repre-
sent the resiliency and the columns represent the number
of variables. Entries with * indicate bounds which have
not yet been achieved. Functions can be constructed with
parameters satisfying the other entries.
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Table 1 can be used as a benchmark for assessing the eﬃ-
cacy of resilient functions construction methods.
4. Experimental results
Now let’s see the results from above mentioned random
resilient function generator against the upper bounds pre-
sented in Table 1.
The maximum nonlinearity is known for all Boolean func-
tions on even number of variables – it is achieved by
bent functions. The maximum nonlinearity for odd variable
Boolean functions is known for n ≤ 7. Also, maximum
nonlinearity question is solved for balanced and resilient
functions on n variables for n ≤ 5 (which is easy to do
by exhaustive computer search). Let’s consider cases for
6 ≤ n ≤ 10.
• n = 6: Maximum nonlinearity for n = 6 is 28 (for
bent functions). Maximum nonlinearity of a bal-
anced function is 26 and construction of such func-
tions is known. Maximum nonlinearities for 1, 2 and
3-resilient functions were shown (be computer
search) to be 24, 24 and 16. Random resilient func-
tion generator presented in this paper is able to gen-
erate 1, 2 and 3-resilient functions.
• n = 7: Maximum nonlinearity of a balanced Boolean
functions for n = 7 is 56. As shown in [30] the
maximum nonlinearities for 1, 2, 3 and 4-resilient
functions are respectively 56, 56, 48, 32. However
2-resilient function with nonlinearity of 56 is not
known. Random generator is able to generate all
these resilient functions except that (7,2,-,56).
• n = 8: Nonlinearity of 8 argument bent function is
120. Maximum (theoretical) nonlinearity for a bal-
anced function is 118, however such function if not
known. Maximum possible nonlinearities for 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5-resilient functions are 116, 112, 112,
96, and 64. The existence of (8,1,-,116) function
is an open problem. Constructions for other func-
tions are known. Random generator can output all
the functions except the not known (8,1,-,116) and
(8,3,-,112).
• n = 9: Maximum nonlinearity of such functions as
an open problem. The known upper bound if 244.
It is easy to construct a function with nonlinearity
of 240. Maximum nonlinearities of resilient func-
tions are 244, 240, 240, 224, 192, 128 for 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6-resilient functions respectively. The genera-
tor is capable of generating (9,1,-,240), (9,2,-,224),
(9,5,-,192) and (9,6,-,128) functions.
• n = 10: The nonlinearity of a bent function is 496.
Maximum nonlinearity of a balanced function is 494,
best know function has linearity of 492. 492, 488,
480, 480, 448, 384, 256 are the nonlinearities of
1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7-resilient function. Constructions of
the following functions are not known: (10,1,-,492),
(10,1,-,488), (10,2,-,488), (10,4,-,480). Random
generator can generate the following: (10,1,-,480),
(10,3,-,448), (10,5,-,384), (10,7,-,256).
5. Conclusions
As shown in the previous paragraph, the random resilient
function generator is capable of generating Boolean func-
tions having some very promising cryptographic qualities.
In many cases these functions are on par with the best
known constructions. In other cases they fall slightly short
of best achievable results. In any case they have the ad-
vantage of being truly random and not being restricted by
speciﬁc constraints associated with each speciﬁc design.
One can suspect that such constraints may render the func-
tion (or a cipher system based on it) vulnerable to some
future cryptographic attack.
Also, results presented in this article are the very ﬁrst re-
sults from the resilient function generator. It’s output re-
lies heavily on parameter setting, mainly on the number
of higher order ANF coeﬃcients in the resulting function.
As this dependencies are investigated we might expect still
better results from the generator.
As with generated bent functions, also generated resilient
functions can have a very compact (small) algebraic normal
form which can be utilized for eﬃcient storage and fast
cryptographic routines.
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Paper End-to-end service survivability
under attacks on networks
Wojciech Molisz and Jacek Rak
Abstract— Network survivability is a capability of a net-
worked system to provide its services despite failures or at-
tacks. Attacks, e.g., due to acts of war, being potentially
damaging events, were basically considered in the historical
definitions of a survivability phenomenon. The meaning of
the term: ”network survivability” evolved in the last decade.
Recently, attacks replayed the important role again. Their na-
ture, however, including intrusions, probes, denials of service,
differs from the old one. Survivability is strongly related to
other fields of study. In particular, quality of service depends
on network survivability. We investigate these dependencies in
scale-free networks. Many networks are scale-free, i.e., their
node degree distribution follows the power law. Nodes of the
highest degrees, called centers, are highly vulnerable to at-
tacks. Elimination of these nodes seriously degrades the over-
all performance of network services. In this paper we propose
a model, which, based on traffic parameters of a demand, like
delay or bit rate, allows to establish the survivable and attack
proof end-to-end connections. The key idea of this model is
that for the significant traffic, it establishes paths, which omit
centers. The important connections become more resistant
to attacks. We show that in the best case, obtained for the
highest class of service, the number of broken connections is
reduced even by factor 3. Example results are compared to
those for the standard distance metrics. Our model is ap-
plicable to many network architectures and many classes of
service.
Keywords— survivable data networks, attacks on networks,
scale-free networks, routing, resource allocation.
1. Introduction
Network survivability is a capability of a networked sys-
tem to provide its services despite failures or attacks. At-
tacks, e.g., due to acts of war, being potentially damaging
events, were basically considered in the historical deﬁni-
tions of a survivability phenomenon. In the last decade,
focus was rather on protecting systems against failures, due
to software defects, hardware faults or human errors. Re-
cently, attacks replayed the important role again. Their
nature, however, including intrusions, probes, denials of
service, diﬀers from the old one.
Survivability is strongly related to other ﬁelds of study,
including fault-tolerance, reliability, safety or performance
evaluation. In particular, quality of service depends on
network survivability. In this paper we investigate these
dependencies in scale-free networks (SFNs). Many net-
works are scale-free, i.e., their node degree distribution fol-
lows the power law. Nodes of the highest degrees, called
centers, are highly vulnerable to attacks. Elimination of
these nodes seriously degrades the overall performance of
network services.
Redundancy is the key to provide services in the face of
attacks or failures. Survivability, based on the experience
of fault tolerance, assumes various techniques of protection
and restoration. Protection in our model is based on the pre-
planned backup path for each active (working) end-to-end
path [7, 10]. Depending on allowable costs, protecting
paths may be either dedicated or shared. This is typical
for all survivable networks. The scale-free networks, how-
ever, need a special treatment.
Centers in such networks are connected to many other
nodes by links of high capacities, switch large amount of
data and are of great degree. They are excellent goals of
malicious attacks, performed by intruders getting the max-
imum destructive eﬀect at minimum cost.
An example of a scale-free network is shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. An example of a scale-free network.
Centers exist in many networks. It has been proved, that
the uncontrolled growth of a network leads to a power law
distribution of node degrees (P(k) ∼ k−γ) [2]. Figure 2
presents the degree distribution P(k) of scale-free networks
compared to random topologies (having the Poisson degree
distribution).
By uncontrolled growth we mean adding the new elements
according to the preferential attachment rule. Following
such a rule, network nodes are mostly being attached to the
already highly connected ones. This phenomenon, often
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referred to as the rich get richer process, causes networks
to become scale-free.
Fig. 2. Comparison of Poisson and power law distributions.
It has been proved that the topology of many wide-area
networks is scale-free [1, 4, 6, 8]. Such topologies can be
also found in other ﬁelds of science, for instance in chem-
istry or biology. Some examples of power law distribution
that are worth mentioning can be found for the stock-price
ﬂuctuations, movie actor collaboration networks, biologi-
cal cellular networks, scientiﬁc citation networks and many
others.
If connections are established with help of the shortest path
algorithm and the standard distance metrics, nodes of ex-
traordinary high degree are often the transit elements of the
installed paths. We deﬁne the parameter named between-
ness centrality with regard to a certain node k, denoted
BC(k) as [5]:
BC(k) = ∑
p 6=q
δk(p,q)
δ (p,q) , (1)
where:
δ (p,q) is the number of shortest paths between nodes p
and q,
δk(p,q) is the number of shortest paths between nodes p
and q that run through a vertex k.
Each central node has a high value of BC, because many
shortest paths established between various pairs of nodes
(p,q) traverse such nodes. Attacks on centers may thus
cause many connections to fail.
In this paper we propose a model, which, based on traﬃc
parameters of a demand, allows to establish the survivable
end-to-end paths in scale-free networks. Speciﬁc properties
of scale-free networks imply the choice of a new metrics
of the cost of a link and new algorithms ﬁnding paths, re-
ducing the number of connections broken due to an attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the model of establishing survivable connections
with regard to the requested level of continuity of service
in scale-free networks. Section 3 presents the integer lin-
ear programming (ILP) formulation of the problem and
the corresponding heuristic algorithm. Modeling results,
obtained for an artiﬁcial scale-free network, are shown in
Section 4 and include: the probability of demand rejection,
length of active path, the number of broken connections
and the values of restoration time.
2. Model description
The main objective of our model is to establish survivable
connections in the way that the number of connections bro-
ken due to an attack on a node is reduced. The decrease
in number of broken connections is to be greater with the
increase of the required level of service. It can be achieved
with help of a metrics that, depending on the requested
class of service, forces active paths to bypass nodes of high
degree.
We consider the network consisting of N nodes and A di-
rected arcs. Nodes and arcs are numbered:
n−1, . . . , N;
a = 1, . . . , A.
We assume K ≤ N(N−1) demands. We denote:
pk(qk) source (destination) of a demand k;
k = 1, 2, . . . , K
ca capacity of an arc a
Λa number of channels of an arc a
∏p,q an active path from pk to qk
∏p,q a backup path from pk to qk
c
[
∏p,q
]
the requested capacity for a connection
from pk to qk
Ca spare capacity on an arc a
M classes of service are assumed, numbered from 0
to M−1. Class 0 represents demands for which the proba-
bility of breaking the connections must be minimized. With
the increase of a class number, the requested level of ser-
vice continuity gets lower. Various types of traﬃc of many
network architectures (e.g., ATM) can be mapped onto the
proposed classes, which makes the approach widely appli-
cable.
In order to ﬁnd active paths on a shortest-path basis, we
propose the metrics that determines the cost κa a of an
arc a, as shown in Eq. (2):
κma =



m
M−1
d∗a +
(M−1)−m
M−1
BC∗(n) if c
[
∏p,q
]
≤Ca
∞ otherwise
,
(2)
where:
m is the current class of service; m = 0,1,2, . . . ,M−1,
d∗a is the normalized length of an arc a:
d∗a =
da
max
a
(da)
. (3)
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BC∗(n) is the normalized value of the betweenness central-
ity of a node n:
BC∗(n) = BC(n)
max
n
(
BC(n)
) . (4)
If there is not enough spare capacity on an arc a to in-
stall the active path (according to the requested capacity
c[∏p,q]), then the cost of using this arc is set to inﬁnity.
Otherwise the cost is the weighted sum of the normalized
length of an arc (d∗a ) and the value of the normalized be-
tweenness centrality coeﬃcient BC∗(n) of the end node n
of an arc a. Two boundary cases are worth explanation:
• Class 0 for demands of the highest quality of ser-
vice. Here the cost of the arc is calculated only on
the basis of the value of BC∗(n). This results in in-
stalling paths that omit central nodes. This causes
the connections of class 0 to have a low probability
of breaking. However, the installed active paths are
not the shortest ones.
• Class M− 1 for connections that do not require the
guarantee of continuity. For them the cost of each
arc is determined by Eq. (2) and is thus equal to:
κM−1a =
{d∗a if c
[
∏p,q
]
≤Ca
∞ otherwise
. (5)
Here, the active paths of connections are the shortest
ones in the sense of distance but often run through
central nodes and are thus exposed to attacks.
For classes 1,2, . . . ,M − 2 characteristics of active paths
with regard to their length and vulnerability to attacks are
expected to be the compromise of the corresponding fea-
tures of classes 0 and M−1, respectively.
Backup paths are found using the standard distance metrics.
In order to allow fast restoration of connections of each
class in case of a failure, the backups are computed as the
shortest ones.
3. Methods used to compute active
and backup paths
In the following part of the paper, the protection against
a single node failure is assumed. All backup paths are
dedicated (not shared). There is only one backup path for
each connection (path protection model).
3.1. The ILP formulation of the problem
We propose using the following nomenclature:
N set of nodes of a network
A set of directed link (arcs) in a network
K number of source-destination (demand) pairs of
nodes, K ≤ N(N−1)
pk source node of a demand k
qk destination node of a demand k
αλk,a takes value of 1 if a channel λ of an arc a is used
by an active path of a demand k; 0 – otherwise
β λk,a takes value of 1 if a channel λ of an arc a is used
by a backup path of a demand k; 0 – otherwise
λa a capacity of an arc a represented by the number of
channels: ∀aλa = Λ
κmk,a the channel cost in an arc a calculated by consider-
ing the class m of a demand k and the length of an
arc according to Eq. (2) (for active paths)
sk,a the channel cost in an arc a calculated for a de-
mand k with regard to its length (for backup paths)
x vector of all components of ﬂows (variables)
It is to ﬁnd paths transporting required ﬂows from sources
to destinations, protecting them against a single node failure
and minimizing the linear cost:
ϕ(x) =
K
∑
k=1
A
∑
a=1
λa∑
λ=1
(
κλk,a ·α
λ
k,a + sk,a ·β λk,a
)
(6)
subject to constraints given in Eqs. (7)–(15).
a) Capacity constraints (on the number of the available
wavelengths on an arc a):
λa∑
λ=1
K
∑
k=1
(
αλk,a +β λk,a
)
≤ λa . (7)
b) The flow balance constraints for each wavelength λ
and for each demand k:
For a source node of an active path:
∑αλk,a
{a:a≡(pk, j); j=1,2,K,N; j 6=pk}
− ∑αλk,a
{a:a≡(i,pk);i=1,2,K,N;i 6=pk}
= 1 .
(8)
For a destination node of an active path:
∑αλk,a
{a:a≡(qk, j); j=1,2,K,N; j 6=qk}
− ∑αλk,a
{a:a≡(i,qk);i=1,2,K,N;i 6=qk}
=−1 .
(9)
For transit nodes of an active path:
∑αλk,a
{a:a≡(i, j); j=1,2,K,N;i,j6=pk,i,j6=qk}
− ∑αλk,a
{a:a≡(i, j);i=1,2,K,N;i, j 6=pk,i,j6=qk}
=0.
(10)
For a source node of a backup path:
∑β λk,a
{a:a≡(pk, j); j=1,2,K,N; j 6=pk}
− ∑β λk,a
{a:a≡(i,pk);i=1,2,K,N;i 6=pk}
= 1 .
(11)
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For a destination node of a backup path:
∑β λk,a
{a:a≡(qk, j); j=1,2,K,N; j 6=qk}
− ∑β λk,a
{a:a≡(i,qk);i=1,2,K,N;i 6=qk}
=−1 .
(12)
For transit nodes of a backup path:
∑β λk,a
{a:a≡(i, j); j=1,2,K,N;i, j6=pk, i, j6=qk}
− ∑β λk,a
{a:a≡(i, j);i=1,2,K,N;i, j6=pk,i, j6=qk}
= 0 .
(13)
c) Constraints assuring nodal-disjointness of active and
backup paths:
λa∑
λ=1
∑
{a:a≡(i, j); j=1,2,K,N; j 6=i;i 6=pk}
(
αλk,a +β λk,a
)
≤ 1 , (14)
λa∑
λ=1
∑
{a:a≡(i, j);i=1,2,K,N;i 6= j; j 6=qk}
(
αλk,a +β λk,a
)
≤ 1 . (15)
Constraint, given in Eq. (7), assures that the total number of
channels, reserved for survivable connections on an arc a,
will not exceed the capacity of this arc. For each channel
and each demand, ﬂow balance for the active paths is as-
sured by Eqs. (8)–(10). For instance, Eq. (8) guarantees
that there is only one active path outgoing from the source
node sk. Equation (10) simply states that transit nodes do
not store traﬃc. Equations (11)–(13) describe the ﬂow bal-
ance constraints for backup paths, respectively.
3.2. The SACC heuristic algorithm
SACC algorithm of establishing survivable and attack-com-
pliant connections
Input:
• A pair of source and destination nodes [pk, qk]
• Requested capacity c [∏p,q]
• Requested class of service m
• Number of classes of service M
1. Find the active path of a connection:
1.1. For each arc a calculate its cost as deﬁned in
Eq. (2)
1.2. Find the shortest path between nodes pk and qk,
using the matrix of costs C, evaluated in 1.1
1.3. If the active path is found then install it, else
go to Step 3
2. Find the backup path:
2.1. For each arc a evaluate its cost as deﬁned in
Eq. (5)
2.2. In order to assure the nodal disjointness of ac-
tive and backup paths of a connection, set the
costs of active path’s arcs as well as arcs inci-
dent to active path’s nodes to inﬁnity
2.3. Find the shortest path between nodes pk and qk,
using the matrix of costs C, evaluated in 2.1
2.4. If the backup path is found then install the path
3. If any of the two paths cannot be found due to the
lack of spare resources, then reject the demand and
remove the active path (if installed), else establish
the connection
The main advantage of using heuristic methods over ILP
approach is their polynomial complexity. SACC algorithm,
described below, uses a Dijkstra’s algorithm to ﬁnd a short-
est path between a pair of a source and destination nodes.
4. Modeling results
In this section we focus our research on measuring the
probability of demand rejection, the average length of ac-
tive path, the number of broken connections and restoration
times for various classes of service. The scale-free network,
shown in Fig. 3, used in research, was generated by Pajek
software.
Fig. 3. The SFN artiﬁcial scale-free network.
According to the values of the normalized betweenness cen-
trality parameter, given in Table 1, nodes: 1, 6, 8, 14 having
high values of BC∗ can be referred to as centers.
Table 1
Values of the normalized betweenness centrality
for nodes of the SFN network
Node k 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
BC∗(k) 0.063 0.367 0.023 0.077 0.046 0.135 1.000
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
0.085 0.462 0.081 0.035 0.058 0.213 0.027 0.300
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All the paths for survivable connections were obtained with
help of AMPL/CPLEX environment as well as with dedi-
cated network simulator, implemented in C++ environment.
Due to the complexity of the optimal algorithm (NP com-
pleteness of the investigated ILP formulation) calculation
of paths was infeasible for real large networks. Simulation
focused on measuring the number of broken connections
and restoration times was then run with the use of our ded-
icated network simulator.
The following properties were assumed for all the directed
links of the network:
– equal number of available channels (here 8);
– equal capacity of all channels;
– equal length (1890 km).
For each connection we assumed:
– class of service chosen randomly out of M available
classes;
– metrics given in Eq. (2) in all active path computa-
tions;
– standard distance metrics, given in Eq. (5), in all
backup path computations;
– a demand of resource allocation equal to the capacity
of one channel of a link;
– protection against a single node failure.
Connections were broken due to attacks on nodes (one each
time). The probability of each node to be attacked was as-
sumed to be proportional to the values of BC∗(k). During
each experiment for the SFN network, 30 logical topologies
were generated. Each logical topology is a graph of a ﬁxed
(here 10) number of randomly chosen pairs of source and
destination nodes. For each logical topology, failures of
100 nodes were generated to measure the numbers of bro-
ken connection and values of restoration time.
4.1. The ILP results
Table 2 shows results of path computation obtained by
solving the optimization problem stated in Subsection 3.1
with help of AMPL/CPLEX environment.
It was to ﬁnd paths for connections of 3 classes of service
available. The results prove that smaller the class number
was (meaning higher requested level of service continu-
ity), more active paths omitted nodes of high degree. For
instance a connection between nodes 1 and 14 of the high-
est (0) class of service, was realized by establishing a long
(but omitting centers; here 6, 8) active path: (1, 5, 7, 11,
13, 14) and a much shorter backup path (1, 6, 14). On the
contrary, a connection of the lowest class (here 2), between
nodes 0 and 4, was realized by a short active path (0, 4)
and a much longer backup path (0, 1, 6, 12, 4).
Table 2
Example paths for 10 survivable connections of 3 classes
of service (0, 1 and 2), established according
to the proposed model
Connection: (0,4) priority: 2
Active path: 0 4
Backup path: 0 1 6 12 4
Connection: (0,11) priority: 1
Active path: 0 1 5 7 11
Backup path: 0 4 12 6 8 11
Connection: (1,12) priority: 1
Active path: 1 6 12
Backup path: 1 0 4 12
Connection: (1,14) priority: 0
Active path: 1 5 7 11 13 14
Backup path: 1 6 14
Connection: (2,7) priority: 1
Active path: 2 1 5 7
Backup path: 2 3 6 8 7
Connection: (2,11) priority: 0
Active path: 2 1 5 7 11
Backup path: 2 3 6 8 11
Connection: (5,11) priority: 1
Active path: 5 7 11
Backup path: 5 6 8 11
Connection: (5,13) priority: 2
Active path: 5 7 11 13
Backup path: 5 6 14 13
Connection: (6,8) priority: 2
Active path: 6 8
Backup path: 6 14 8
Connection: (0,14) priority: 2
Active path: 9 6 14
Backup path: 9 10 8 14
4.2. Probability of demand rejection
We considered the phenomenon of demand rejection due
to all possible reasons. The main causes included:
– lack of available link channels;
– topology bottlenecks.
Figure 4 shows the probability of demand rejection for
3 classes of service, while Fig. 5 – for 6 classes of ser-
vice, respectively.
Comparing results for M classes of service, we see that
CPLEX served all the demands. This is due to the fact that
only 10 demands were deﬁned for each logical topology
and there was enough resources to serve all of them. In
contrast, our heuristic algorithm found local optima and,
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Fig. 4. Probability of demand rejection for 3 classes of service.
Fig. 5. Probability of demand rejection for 6 classes of service.
due to bottlenecks, some of the demands were rejected.
There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the total number of
rejected demands between 3 and 6 classes of service.
4.3. Number of active path links
Figures 6 and 7, and Table 3 show the numbers of active
path links as the function of the connection class of service.
When increasing the level of the requested continuity of
service of a connection (decreasing the class number), its
active path becomes longer. This is because it omits nodes
Fig. 6. Average number of active path links for 3 classes of
service.
of high degree. In the worst case for 3 classes of service,
the average length of active path obtained for the class 0,
was about 1.31 times worse than for the class 2.
Fig. 7. Average number of active path links for 6 classes of
service.
Table 3
Average number of active path links for 3 and 6 classes
of service (CPLEX)
Number of service classes 3
Class number 0 1 2
Active path length (CPLEX) 2.84 2.23 2.16
[links] (heuristics) 2.84 2.15 1.98
95% conﬁdence (CPLEX) 0.48 0.27 0.27
interval [links] (heuristics) 0.49 0.26 0.26
Number of service classes 6
Class number 0 1 2 3 4 5
Active path length (CPLEX) 2.79 2.32 2.33 2.22 2.12 2.19
[links] (heuristics) 2.77 2.32 2.30 2.20 2.06 2.09
95% conﬁdence (CPLEX) 0.69 0.50 0.46 0.38 0.37 0.33
interval [links] (heuristics) 0.67 0.51 0.46 0.39 0.38 0.33
Typically, heuristic algorithms give worse results than the
respective ILP ones. Generally, this remains true for our
SACC algorithm. However, due to the non-zero proba-
bility of rejecting the demands for the SACC algorithm
(Figs. 4 and 5), the obtained active paths turned out to
be shorter than the respective ILP ones. This was due to
the smaller network congestion, obtained when SACC algo-
rithm was used, as it established less connections than the
ILP algorithm. This feature caused similar eﬀect regarding
the aggregate number of broken connections and the total
restoration time, described in the next subsections.
4.4. Number of broken connections
Figures 8 and 9 show the aggregate numbers of broken con-
nections as the function of the connection class of service.
They prove that the proposed model results in a signiﬁcant
decrease in the number of broken connections. The higher
the requested level of service continuity is, the decrease
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in the number of broken connections gets more visible.
In the best case, observed for 6 classes of service, about
67% less connections were broken for the class 0, compared
to the results for the class 5.
Fig. 8. Aggregate number of broken connections for 3 classes of
service.
Fig. 9. Aggregate number of broken connections for 6 classes of
service.
4.5. Restoration time
Figures 10 and 11 show the values of the average restoration
time as the function of the connection class of service.
They represent the time needed to restore a connection after
Fig. 10. Average restoration time [ms] for 3 classes of service.
Fig. 11. Average restoration time [ms] for 6 classes of service.
a failure of a node, according to the protocol described
in [11]. They prove that for the SFN network the value
of restoration time does not depend much on the service
class. This dependency is, however, very remarkable when
analyzing the aggregate value of restoration time. Such an
aggregate value for a given class k is calculated as the sum
of all restoration times for connections of class k during
one experiment.
Fig. 12. Aggregate restoration time [ms] for 3 classes of service.
Fig. 13. Aggregate restoration time [ms] for 6 classes of service.
Figures 12 and 13 prove that the proposed model leads to
a signiﬁcant reduction in the value of the aggregate restora-
tion time. The higher the requested level of service con-
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tinuity is, the aggregate value of restoration time is more
reduced (even about 4 times for the class 0, when 6 classes
are used).
5. Conclusions
Results obtained by us conﬁrm that the proposed model
contributes to a signiﬁcant reduction in the number of bro-
ken connections for classes of high priority. The active
paths of such connections omit central nodes and are thus
more resistant to attacks. On the other hand, low prior-
ity connections are often exposed to attacks. They are,
however, realized by the shortest active paths (in the sense
of distance), providing shorter values of data transmission
delay.
Concluding the paper, we point out that in a scale-free net-
work, one cannot have connections that are simultaneously
resistant-to-attack and are realized by short active paths.
A short active path of a connection means that with high
probability it goes through central nodes and thus is at high
risk of breaking.
However, we claim that establishing attack-resistant connec-
tions, realized by short active paths could be possible for
networks of a regular topology. For the scale-free network
it would be the best to make it more regular. Topology
improvements are, however, beyond the scope of this paper
and constitute the subject for future research.
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Paper New model of identity checking
in telecommunication digital channels
Piotr Gajewski, Jerzy Łopatka, and Zbigniew Piotrowski
Abstract— We proposed an OFDM and watermarking
based technology system for correspondent identity verifica-
tion (CIVS) in military telecommunication digital channels.
Correspondent personal identity signature (CPIS) is repre-
sented by digital watermark. The main idea of this system
solution is to verify the end user who sends acoustic signal,
e.g., speech, music, etc., via Internet, HF/UHF radio, mo-
dem, etc. OFDM modulation scheme is used to prepare se-
cret digital signature. This signature is a single-use secret key
used for correspondent verification, thus binary sequence of
that key is changing for every session. We describe transmit-
ter and receiver block scheme. The results of experiments for
both ideal and degraded signals are described in details too.
The results are summarized with comments and conclusion.
Keywords—identity checking, watermark, watermark transceiver,
watermark receiver, OFDM generator, watermarked host quality,
ITU-BS1116-1 test, subjective quality test.
1. Watermarking eruption
At present we are the witnesses of large watermarking ap-
plication eruption. The efficiency of the personal comput-
ers enables realization of even very computational expen-
sive algorithms. The goal of the watermarking technol-
ogy is to hide additional signal under another, host sig-
nal. This additional signal can be a clear or encrypted se-
quence stream. Main methods for audio watermarking are
well documented [1–5]. Following schemes are the most
popular:
– phase modulation,
– spread spectrum,
– quantized index modulation o frequency and ampli-
tude keying,
– echo modeling,
– least significant bit (LSB) coding.
Goals of actual investigations conducted in many laborato-
ries concentrate on finding optimal compromise between:
robustness, data payload and watermark transparency. The
ideal watermarking system can produce signal transpar-
ent for human auditory system (HAS) [7], enables hidden
message reliability and robustness against intentional at-
tacks. A potential watermarking application for military
purposes can be, a system for correspondent identity veri-
fication (CIVS). The main CIVS feature is message sender
authorization in telecommunication channels. CIVS were
designed and implemented as software in Matlab 7.0 envi-
ronment and was tested in various acoustical environment
conditions.
2. System for correspondent identity
verification scheme
Figure 1 shows a scheme of CIVS transmitter and receiver.
Digital signature (CPIS) is a unique binary sequence, dedi-
cated for only one session. This correspondent personal
identity signature (CPIS) is coded with Reed-Solomon-
correspondent identity personal signature (RS-CIPS) pro-
cedure to make CPIS robust against errors at the receiver
side. Six additional bits were entered to the output RS-
CIPS to ensure proper detection of false positive errors.
Fig. 1. CIVS transmitter and receiver scheme.
An orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM)
modulator generates a signal according to RS-CIPS. Basic
OFDM modulation scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Basic OFDM modulation scheme.
Binary stream in RS-CIPS form, modulate frequency shift
keying (FSK) mapper, that decides which fast Fourier trans-
form (FFT) bin should be filled. Serial to parallel con-
version is required to process spectrum by IFFT function.
Signal need to be converted into serial form to create an
OFDM signal in time domain. Orthogonally formed har-
monics are shown in Fig. 3.
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Watermark signal (WM) is located in 4 kHz frequency
band. Power spectrum density function (PSD) of the host
signal is cumulated on this region, and it is more efficient to
hide relatively stronger additional signal (WM) under host
signal in this region. HAS filter contains build-in MPEG-1
audio analysis procedure to compute just noticeable differ-
ence level (JND).
Fig. 3. OFDM generated watermark.
Signal that possesses less PSD then estimated JND is not
noticeable by HAS at host signal presence. Input host sig-
nal is processed by MPEG-1 algorithm to inform HAS fil-
ter about host’s JND threshold level. HAS filter is a two-
stage, frequency band corrector. First stage of HAS filtering
is a watermark spectrum shaping according to the host sig-
nal spectrum. The second one is correcting a power level of
watermark spectrum below estimated JND threshold. Two-
stage of HAS filtering is shown in Figs. 4 and 5.
Fig. 4. First stage of HAS filtering: spectrum shaping.
Fig. 5. Second stage of HAS filtering: level correction.
The effect of the HAS filtering can be illustrated by com-
paring WM before and after two-stage correction process
(Figs. 6 and 7).
Fig. 6. WM before HAS filter correction.
Fig. 7. WM after HAS filter correction.
Watermark receiver bases on main module: coherent spec-
trum averager. Spectrum averaging can reduce noise by re-
ducing its standard variation for uncorrelated components.
In this application the noise is represented by a host signal,
which is not correlated contrary to WM, because WM is
periodically generated according to the same pattern. Wa-
termark gain SNRcoh [6] in this method is given as:
SNRcoh =
δorg
δorg/
√
M
=
√
M , (1)
where:
δorg – standard deviation of the original signal,
M – number of averaging frames.
Fig. 8. Spectrum of the watermarked host, before and after
coherent averaging.
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We can notice, that SNRcoh is proportional to the square
root of the M number averaging frames. Decoder, presented
in Fig. 1, is responsible for correct decision. Decoder rule
bases on WM level detection. The binary output stream
is error corrected in Reed-Solomon decoder, thus correct
CPIS should be received. The result of the coherent aver-
aging process is shown in Fig. 8.
3. Quality of watermarked signal
Coding WM in the audio host signal we agree on degrada-
tion of this signal. The standard ITU-BS1116-1 test [8]
can estimate quality of watermarked signal and degree
of its degradation. In our test set of 22 listeners were
asked to assess quality of tracks, watermarked by CIVS.
ITU-BS1116-1 describes in details full procedure and en-
vironment conditions to be fulfilled to get reliable results.
Five points degree scale is used for watermarked signal
quality estimation (Table 1).
Table 1
Grading scale for ITU-BS1116-1 test
Impairment Grade
Imperceptible 5.0
Perceptible, but not annoying 4.0
Slightly annoying 3.0
Annoying 2.0
Very annoying 1.0
One subject at a time is involved and the selection of one
of three stimuli (“A”,“B”,“C”) is at the discretion of this
subject. The known reference is always available as stimu-
lus “A”. The hidden reference and the object are simultane-
ously available but are “randomly” assigned to “B” and “C”
depending to the trial. Listener assesses which one from
two similar signals “B” or “C” is watermarked.
Based on this grading scale, the diff grades scale (SDG)
values are computed. Signal is imperceptible if SDG is
higher than –1 value. In case the SGD is a positive value,
Fig. 9. SDG values for tracks coded by SCVI transmitter.
it indicates that listener assessed that watermarked signal
had better quality then the host. Results of carried out
ITU BS1116-1 test are illustrated in Fig. 9.
We observe in Fig. 9, that group of listeners could not
correctly recognize embedded watermark in tracks. None
of the tested tracks achieved –1 SDG value.
4. Test beds for CIVS
Laboratory tests were carried out for evaluation of the CPIS
coding and decoding effectiveness and were conducted us-
ing HF/UHF radio stations with acoustic link on the re-
ceiver side. Internet SCVI mode based on standard voice
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is also available and passed,
the same procedures carried out in radio link mode. Con-
figurations of test beds are illustrated in Figs. 10 and 11.
Fig. 10. Test bed CIVS – HF/UHF radio link mode.
Fig. 11. Test bed CIVS – Internet VoIP mode.
The CIVS works in HF/UHF radio link with acoustic link
on the receiver side, or in Internet using voice over Inter-
net Protocol. Radio link mode with acoustic link requires
very stable and precise quartz clocks for timing a/d and d/a
converters with ±1 ppm short-time stability. This require-
ment must be fulfilled to ensure coherention in spectrum
averager module.
5. Decoding host signal without
embedded CPIS
One of the critical imposed requirements is SCVI robust-
ness against wrong decision (false positive errors). When
host signal is not watermarked, decoder must detect this
fact and inform user that correspondent is not authorized for
lack of valid CPIS. We examined decoding process in vari-
ous acoustic environments (Fig. 10): silent, office, HMMV.
Results of CIPS decoding (27 bits length) are illustrated in
Figs. 12, 13 and 14. Figures show the performance of the
CIVS decoder for various input signal duration time 1 s,
10 s, 20 s and 30 s. Thus we can determine the number
of M iterations used in formula 1 and SNRcoh. The deci-
sion that CIPS is not embedded in a host signal is based
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on a number of properly decoded “pilot” bits (p). Trans-
mitter embedded six pilot bits and four or more (up to 6)
correct decoded bits are enough to detect a fact that host
contains a hidden signature. Overall number of decoded
bits is indicated as (b) in Figs. 12, 13, and 14, and sym-
bols of the three decoded tracks were indicated as 001,
004 and 019.
Fig. 12. Decoding host signal without embedded CIPS. Acoustic
signal not degraded (silence, SNR = 10 dB).
Fig. 13. Decoding host signal without embedded CIPS. Acoustic
signal degraded (office, SNR =−10 dB).
Summarizing, CIVS will not detect CIPS in host sig-
nal until host signal will be coded by this system. Thus
Fig. 14. Decoding host without embedded CIPS. Acoustic signal
degraded (HMV, SNR =−10 dB).
host signal itself can not produce false-positive decision
(“silent”) even if it is degraded by strong (–10 dB) degrad-
ing signal (“office”, “HMMV”).
6. Decoding watermarked host signal
We verified the correctness of CIPS decoding when
host signal is watermarked by CIVS. We examined de-
coding process in various acoustic environments: silent
(25 tracks), office (3 tracks), high-mobility multi-purpose
vehicle (HMMV) (3 tracks) and for various input signal
duration time: 20 s and 30 s. Results of decoding CIPS
(27 bits length) are illustrated in Figs. 15, 16 and 17.
Decoder gives correct CIPS even for very strong degraded
signal (–10 dB). In all cases CIVS detects a fact that sig-
Fig. 15. Decoding host signal with embedded CIPS. Acoustic
signal not degraded (silence, SNR = 10 dB).
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Fig. 16. Decoding host signal with embedded CIPS. Acoustic
signal degraded (office).
Fig. 17. Decoding host signal with embedded CIPS. Acoustic
signal degraded (HMMV).
nal is watermarked. Because proposed Reed-Solomon code
scheme has ability to correct only 3 bits, the figures where
number of errors is higher than 3, decoded CIPS was not
correct.
7. Just noticeable difference level
changing
We verified the correctness of CIPS decoding when host
signal is watermarked by CIVS using various modifica-
tions of JND level. Signal-to-mask ratio (SMR) coef-
ficient describes proportion between power of host sig-
nal and WM. Standard MPEG-1 psychoacoustic procedure
compute SMR = JND level for audio host signal and this
is optimal value from listener point of view, but when
SMR level is smaller we can decode MW with greater
efficiency (higher WM power) and with higher probabil-
ity that HAS recognize watermarked signal. In opposite,
higher SMR can reduce watermark HAS detection proba-
bility to zero but correct WM detection will be impossible
because of too small WM power. In this experiment we
correct JND level using values: –9 dB –6 dB –3 dB 0 dB
3 dB 6 dB and 9 dB thus 0 dB equals JND level com-
puted for MPEG-1. Duration time 10 s for each from three
tested tracks was assumed. Results of this experiment are
illustrated in Figs. 18, 19, 20 and 21. We can notice that
Fig. 18. Errors in SMR function.
Fig. 19. Pilot errors in SMR function.
Fig. 20. CIVS decisions for WM presence detection.
Fig. 21. CIVS decisions for correct CPIS decoding.
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CIVS is very robust for false-negative detection. SMR be-
low JND level (0 dB) reduce effectiveness (decoding for
10 s averaging).
8. Conclusion
Presented system proves its usability at the laboratory
tests. The correspondent ID signature can be detected with
success (watermark transmitted in digital channels, even
strongly degraded). Future experiments will concentrate
on higher system effectiveness and robustness for loose
compression and higher number of embedded bits. CIVS
can be used in those military systems where identification
has a priority before message interpretation. Implementing
hash function for host signal we can get a message authen-
tication system (MAS) and together with CIVS mechanism
it enables, high priority message will never be anonymous
and always will be integral.
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Paper Planning the introduction
of IPv6 in NATO
Robert Goode
Abstract— The NATO wide area network provides secure
IP services to NATO commands and agencies, and offers in-
formation exchange gateways to nations and coalition opera-
tions. The IP services support the NATO-wide deployment
of core automated information systems (AIS), and the place-
ment of specific functional area services (e.g., intelligence, lo-
gistics, C2IS for the services, etc.) at commands. To maintain
and improve interoperability within NATO and with partners,
NATO will transition from version four of the Internet Pro-
tocol (IPv4) to version six (IPv6). The transition to IPv6 will
involve the IP network, the information exchange gateways,
the core AIS, the functional area services, and the supporting
CIS infrastructure. The IPv6 naming and addressing plan
being developed supports the NATO command structure and
interoperability with NATO partners. The critical issue in the
planning process is to support the incremental introduction of
IPv6 whilst maintaining network security and reliable inter-
working with existing IPv4 systems and limiting increases in
operations and maintenance costs. To minimise costs and
maximise effectiveness NATO is planning the transition in
a timescale that is commensurate with commercial adoption
in NATO countries, the technology refreshment points for ma-
jor systems, and the availability of IPv6 security components.
New NATO projects will prepare for the transition by detailing
their IPv6 upgrade path and procuring dual stack (IPv4 and
IPv6) equipment. NATO will develop and adopt standardised
approaches for IPv6 protocols and network design.
Keywords— Internet Protocol, IPv6, transition, NATO, CIS.
1. Introduction
The NATO operates a broad range of communications and
information systems (CIS) at NATO headquarters (HQ),
organizations and agencies. The sites are linked by the
NATO secret wide area network (NSWAN), which pro-
vides a NATO-wide, cost-effective, interoperable and se-
cure capability. NATO also operates the NATO unclassi-
fied WAN (NUWAN) and a number of mission/theatre clas-
sified WANs (MSWAN). The NATOWANs provide crypto-
graphically protected virtual private networks (VPN). The
traffic on the plaintext (high side) side of the encryption
device is referred to as “red”, whilst the enciphered traf-
fic (on the low side) is referred to as “black”. The terms
“red” and “black” are used in this paper to refer to these
two cryptographically separated routing domains as shown
in Fig. 1.
The NATO CIS are divided into core area services (CAS),
which are used by all NATO users, and the functional area
services (FAS), which are role-based applications. The CAS
provides NATO-wide automated information applications
such as electronic mail, web services and document prepa-
ration tools. The FAS support specific functions such as
logistics, ground, maritime and air operations, intelligence
services, etc. The NATO CIS interfaces to national fixed
Fig. 1. “Red” and “black” routing domains.
and mobile networks to cover the whole NATO area to
support high level political consultation and command and
control of military forces. NATO CIS is being transformed
to achieve the NATO network enabled capability (NNEC)
with a seamless flow of information, and to support the
NATO response force (NRF). The NATO response force
will be a coherent, high readiness, joint, multinational force
package, technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, in-
teroperable and sustainable. As part of the ongoing CIS
transformation NATO is planning for a transition of the
packet switched NATO VPN (NVPN) from version four of
the Internet Protocol (IPv4) to version six (IPv6) [1].
At the time of writing three NATO nations (FR, GE,
US [2]) have issued directives relating to the use of IPv6
in their national defence infrastructure, and the US has
directed the use of IPv6 in other government depart-
ments [3, 4]. The Commission of the European Com-
munities issued a communication to the Council and the
European parliament in 2002 [5] which called upon mem-
ber states to encourage transition towards IPv6. All ma-
jor vendors of network routers support IPv6, and the ven-
dor of the dominant operating system for PCs (Microsoft)
has stated that the next major update to the Windows plat-
form, due out in 2006, will use IPv6 as the preferred trans-
port [6].
The main goals for the NATO IPv6 transition are to:
– support the NNEC seamless flow of information;
– maintain and improve interoperability;
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– take advantage of new capabilities to increase func-
tionality and reduce cost;
– stay in line with commercial developments.
This paper considers the planning necessary to achieve the
NATO IPv6 transition goals, which involves a pervasive
change across the whole of NATO CIS and interfaces to
NATO nations and NATO partners. The aims and objec-
tives of the transition planning are presented, and an outline
is given of the technical areas being considered. This paper
focuses on the transition planning for the communications
systems, and discusses planning guidance to NATO and
national users at the strategic and tactical level on using
the IPv6 NATO WANs.
2. The IPv6 transition planning – outline
The NATO IPv6 transition planning will:
• Develop an evolutionary IPv6 transition plan for
NATO CIS infrastructure:
– specify the IPv6-support to be built into the
NATO WANs;
– specify the approach for naming, addressing,
routing, network management, security and
transition mechanisms in the NATO WANs.
• Determine the manner in which interoperability will
be maintained with NATO partners during the tran-
sition:
– develop guidance to NATO partners on inter-
working with NATO during the transition.
• Provide NATO with the concepts and know-how to
migrate the CIS across strategic and deployed sys-
tems to work on a single virtual IPv6 network:
– develop guidance to core and functional area
services to become IPv6-ready;
– identify the standards which must be supported
in specific functional elements.
• Identify new capabilities in IPv6 of which NATO can
take advantage:
– examine: multicast, anycast, multiple address
plans, radically increased address space, auto
configuration, mobility support, flow label-
ling, etc.
• Determine the timelines and approaches which
achieve the best cost-benefit for the transition in
a timescale commensurate with the commercial adop-
tion in NATO countries:
– work with NATO nations, partners, and indus-
try on timeline planning.
• The transition planning is broad in scope to introduce
the system, technical and operational views which
need to be considered due to the pervasive nature of
an IP transition. In order to support the broad nature
of the planning process, the follow methods are used:
– technical studies;
– NATO working groups with representation
from all NATO stakeholders;
– in-house test-beds and multinational experimen-
tation;
– participation in IPv6-related forums and events;
– IPv6-related training.
3. IPv6-support in the NATO WANs
The NATO WANs must maintain full support for existing
IPv4 services during the transition period, to avoid breaks
in operational service. This means that the IPv6-support
must be in parallel to the IPv4 support, and must not neg-
atively impact it. A second requirement is that the IPv6
access must be ubiquitous, rather than constrained to spe-
cific network access points. The transition to IPv6 is en-
visaged as evolutionary, with an initial low level of IPv6
traffic, which increases over the lifetime of the transition.
The transition period is expected to be measured in decades
because of the need to maintain IPv4 support to inter-work
with legacy systems. The IPv6 support must thus scale
from minimal usage to being the dominant traffic type, and
should do so in a manner that is cost-effective over the
lifetime of the transition.
The NATO WANs need to support routing of IPv6 traf-
fic in an efficient manner, and name resolution through an
IPv6-enabled domain name service (DNS), which needs
to operate effectively in parallel to an IPv4-enabled DNS.
The whole network must be operated securely with guard
technology to protect against external network attacks, and
intrusion detection to monitor the internal integrity of the
environment.
3.1. Naming structure
The fully qualified domain names applied to network de-
vices are frequently visible to users (for example in uniform
resource locators – URLs) and so need to make sense to
non-technical staff, as well as supporting the needs of net-
work managers. The naming structure is often driven by
organizational structure, and uses a standardized format for
naming devices types (routers, switches, workstations) and
usage (mail server, firewall, administrator, etc.).
The transition from IPv4 to IPv6 does not intrinsically
alter the organizational structure or application usage;
therefore the existing IPv4 naming structure will be ap-
plied to IPv6. The approach clearly simplifies the net-
work manager’s task of identifying a specific device in both
the IPv4 and IPv6 network. The approach also means that
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the user does not need to know whether an application
is being accessed via IPv4 or IPv6, as the same name
can be used in both cases. De-conflicting the resolving
of DNS queries which may result in an IPv4 or an IPv6 ad-
dress (or both) places some constraints on the deployment
of the IPv6.
3.2. Addressing plan
Numerical representations of IPv4 addresses are usually
hidden from end users, who use the human-readable names
instead. The addressing plan can thus be divorced from
organizational structure and the use to which a network el-
ement is put; and be driven by the network structure to
improve operating efficiency and easy maintenance. Two
significant considerations for the addressing plan are aggre-
gation to reduce routing table size and frequency of rout-
ing advertisements, and scalability to support growth (both
planned and exceptional). An addressing plan therefore
tends to be hierarchically constructed along geographic (or
connectivity) lines, and have reservations for future growth.
The transition from IPv4 to IPv6 does not intrinsically
alter the network structure or growth forecast, therefore
the existing IPv4 addressing plan format will be applied
to IPv6. This may mean that a simple mapping function can
be used to map hierarchical elements of the IPv4 address
onto equivalent elements of the IPv6 address. Clearly there
are differences between the IPv4 and IPv6 address formats
defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
such as the number of bits and the manner in which the
addressing mode (unicast, multicast, globally routable ver-
sus private/link-local, etc.) is encoded in the bits, and these
must be taken into account. Some new capabilities in IPv6
which must be assessed are the option to have multiple
addresses plans (with multiple addresses per network inter-
face), the use of anycast, and renumbering.
3.3. Routing
The NATO WANs require an interior gateway proto-
col (IGP) for distributing routing information internally. An
exterior gateway protocol is required for exchanging rout-
ing information with peer networks. NATO currently has
a limited requirement for IP multicast, which seems likely
to increase to achieve the NNEC vision of seamless infor-
mation exchange. The “red” routing domain is separated
from the “black” routing domain by IP-based encryption
devices, but both routing domains must be co-operatively
managed to achieve a stable and robust network that can
support the required network quality of service.
3.4. Network management
A critical element of a reliable CIS infrastructure is the
network management system. The network manager needs
to view the traffic load and health of the distributed network
elements in order to perform problem identification and
resolution, and to plan provisioning schedules. The network
management system will need to be dual-stacked to provide
the monitor and control interface for both the IPv4 and the
IPv6 components. An approach is required that will achieve
harmonized network management of both the “red” and
“black” domains for the NATO WANs. A sample of the
requirements is given below:
• Automated address space management for both IPv4
and IPv6.
• Network monitoring and visualisation for both IPv4
and IPv6.
• Scaleable element management.
• Extensible for QoS, transition mechanisms, gateways,
applications.
• Manage multiple inter-dependent networks:
– IPv4 and IPv6 networks,
– Enciphered virtual private networks (“red”)
over range of bearers (“black”).
3.5. Security
Security is a strong requirement for NATO classified sys-
tems. In addition to the confidentiality requirements which
can be met by a high-grade IPv4 and IPv6-capable encryp-
tion device, there are requirements for integrity, authenti-
cation, non-repudiation, reliability, auditing, intrusion de-
tection, and physical security. The full range of high-grade
security devices must be available in IPv6-capable form
to work in concert with the existing IPv4 devices without
significantly increasing the total cost of ownership of the
secure networks.
3.6. Transition mechanisms
The IETF has issued a number of request for comment
(RFC) documents, e.g. [7–9], which describe a range of
transition mechanisms that meet the identified requirements
for IPv6 support in the NATO WANs. The simplest ini-
tial approach is to transport IPv6 packets encapsulated in
IPv4 packets (tunnelling) over the existing IPv4 infrastruc-
ture. This works well when the IPv6 traffic is sparse, as
was demonstrated by the success of the 6bone [10, 11],
but as an approach its suitability is inversely proportional
to the quantity of IPv6 traffic. Given that the IPv6 traf-
fic will eventually be dominant, a more suitable approach
is to support native IPv4 and IPv6 traffic simultaneously
by using dual-stack network elements. Consideration must
also be given to converting the network cores from IPv4
to IPv6, and tunnelling IPv4 over IPv6 in the core. The
cost-benefit analysis is a significant part of determining the
best approach.
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There are also requirements to gateway traffic between IPv4
and IPv6 systems, i.e., to interconnect them rather than
just enable them to operate in parallel. The IETF has doc-
umented a number of application-level transition mecha-
nisms [7].
There is a body of work on the advantages and dis-
advantages of each transition mechanism in specific cir-
cumstances, which includes guidance on transition plan-
ning [12–15]. This experience will form a valuable input
to NATO.
4. New capabilities in IPv6
The design of IPv6 has benefited from decades of expe-
rience with IPv4 networks. The most visible change is
that the address space has been drastically increased, from
32-bits to 128-bits. Other improvements have also been
made, in the areas of multicast, anycast, mobility, and auto-
configuration. There is also a field which traffic sources
can use to label flows through the network which may offer
practical benefits to NATO networks by enabling a richer
support for network quality of service than is possible for
IPv4 (see for example [16] for the issues, [17] and [18] for
a possible way forward).
5. Guidance to information services
The purpose of enabling IPv6 support in the NATO WANs
is to facilitate IPv6 applications. One obvious part of the
guidance to the information service developers is to port
their networked applications to an IPv6 stack. It is ad-
ditionally necessary to provide guidance on inter-working
IPv4 with IPv6, including information on when to use spe-
cific approaches out of the range on transition mechanisms
available. One example of such guidance is [15].
6. Guidance to NATO partners
Maintaining and improving interoperability with NATO
nations and partners is a key driver for the transition
to IPv6 by NATO. The exchange of information between
NATO and a nation or organization is achieved through
information exchange gateways (IEGs) [19, 20] as shown
in Fig. 2.
The IEGs implement application-level proxies and guard
functions for web and electronic-mail, thereby enabling
controlled release of data. Applications which require ad-
ditional services through the IEG can develop the neces-
sary application-level proxies and accredited guard func-
tions. The IEGs do not provide a general packet routing
service, but instead form an IP break. This means that rout-
ing information does not flow between NATO and nations
or partners through an IEG.
Fig. 2. Use of information exchange gateways.
7. The IPv6 compliance
A common definition of IPv6 compliant that can be uni-
formly applied in procurement of NATO common-funded
equipment is a pre-requisite to achieving a fully functional
IPv6 network, and a vital part of defining a standardized in-
terconnection point for NATO and national systems. Work
on this topic has been performed in a number of fora, in-
cluding the IPv6 ready program [21], the European Com-
munity [22], and the US DoD [23]. NATO will build on
this body of work to develop a common NATO definition
in consultation with the nations.
8. Experimentation
NATO actively utilizes testing, experimentation and exer-
cises to support interoperability testing of NATO and na-
tional systems. Relevant activities include the NATO in-
teroperability environment testing infrastructure (NIETI),
the annual coalition warrior interoperability demonstration,
combined endeavour, the Interoperable Networks for Secure
Communications (INSC) project, and the Combined Feder-
ated Battle Laboratories Network (CFBLNet). INSC [24]
is an eight-nation project to develop the future communica-
tions architecture for combined joint out-of-area operations,
and it has an IPv6-focus [25]. The CFBLNet [26] is an
arrangement between the US, Combined Communications-
Electronics Board (CCEB) and NATO to provide the net-
work of choice for test and evaluation experimentation. The
charter nations/organisations are the US, the CCEB nations
(AUS, CAN, NZ, UK, US), the NATO nations, and NATO
as an organisation. The CFBLNet is currently running
a multinational IPv6 initiative.
In order to achieve increased interoperability experimen-
tation will be used to validate the operation of selected
transition mechanisms, naming and addressing plans, secu-
rity devices, routing approaches, etc. Such experimentation
is already underway and will need to be continued for the
duration of the transition, which is likely to continue for
many years.
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9. Training
Training of the network designers, network operators, se-
curity experts, and application developers will be required
to achieve a successful transition. This will ensure that the
appropriate transition mechanisms are applied in each case,
and with the necessary security configurations.
10. Conclusion
This paper has introduced the areas which must be covered
by the NATO IPv6 transition planning process in order
to successfully manage the introduction and migration to
IPv6 whilst maintaining the interoperability with existing
IPv4 systems over a prolonged transition period.
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Abstract— Providing quality of service (QoS) into the net-
works based on the packet switched technologies, as ATM
and IP, is currently the challenge for the military communi-
cation system designers. The main element for achieving QoS
capabilities is to implement effective admission control (AC)
function, which regulates the volume of submitted traffic to
the network. The traditional approach for the AC is that it
is invoked by each call requesting QoS. As a consequence, the
call set-up latency is increasing and, in addition, the signal-
ing traffic in the network is growing. This paper proposes
a simple AC method that is based on the online traffic load
measurements and assumes that the AC is involved only when
the load exceeds a predefined threshold. As a consequence,
for most of the connections the AC is not necessary to be exe-
cuted and this causes lower set-up phase duration and limits
the volume of signaling traffic. The numerical results showing
effectiveness of the approach are included and compared with
traditional AC performing.
Keywords— QoS, admission control, measurement based AC.
1. Introduction
The evolution scenario of military networks assumes that
the packet switched networks, based on ATM/IP technolo-
gies, will substitute the existing circuits switched networks.
Notice, that in the most of the NATO countries this process
was finished or is currently running. Let us remark that
packet networks designed for the military should provide
quality of service (QoS) capabilities for the packet transmis-
sion level since some information needs to be transmitted as
urgent or very urgent. So, we can not rather use the best ef-
fort service only as it is available in today’s public Internet.
The QoS requirements coming from the military applica-
tions are mainly referring to the timely context delivery and
real time transmission capabilities for such applications as
voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), videoconference, radar
data, etc.
One can distinguish between two methods for providing
QoS capabilities into the packet switched networks. The
more complex approach is to implement in the network ad-
ditional QoS mechanisms working on different time scale,
like traffic control mechanisms at the packet level (classi-
fiers, schedulers, markers, etc.), traffic control mechanism
at the call level – admission control (AC) as well as ade-
quate QoS routing procedures. It is worth to mention that
these mechanisms could be collected in the form of appro-
priate QoS architecture as differentiated services (DiffServ)
architecture [1]. The second approach is to keep the net-
work in the over-provisioned state. Anyway, such approach
that can be effective in the public core IP-based networks
is not appropriate to be applied in the military, especially
on the tactical level, where we face with the radio or radio-
relay links with limited capacity. As a consequence, the
more attractive solution for providing QoS in the military
IP-based networks is to follow the approach with engaging
traffic control mechanisms, where the AC function plays
a key role.
The traditional approach for the AC is that it is invoked
by each call requesting QoS. As a consequence, the call
set-up latency is increasing and, in addition, the signaling
traffic in the network is growing. In order to overcome
this problem, in this paper we propose and evaluate a new
strategy for performing in an effective way AC function,
targeted to limit invocation of the AC but keeping QoS
capabilities. The discussed approach, named as AC with
threshold (AC-T), is based on the online traffic load mea-
surements. It assumes that the AC is invoked only when
the traffic load exceeds a predefined threshold.
2. Proposed AC-T method
The strategy based on the invocation of AC each time when
new call is submitted to the system is the most popular so-
lution for achieving QoS guarantees in the network. Let
us recall that the AC makes the decision about admis-
sion/rejection of new call on the basis of the traffic decla-
rations and the current traffic load. Anyway, when decision
is to accept, the network guarantees that the packet transfer
characteristics will satisfy the QoS objectives as assumed
for the AC. This strategy is typical for QoS networks.
The call request includes QoS needs coming from the
user application, e.g., requested bandwidth, accepted packet
losses, etc. The appropriate network control entities hold
current status of the network resources and give the nec-
essary information for making AC decision. The available
resources are computed accordingly to the predefined QoS
objectives. For example, QoS objectives for voice traffic are
target values of maximum delay, maximum delay variation
and packet loss ratio.
In the simplest case, when the provisioning of resources
is based using static bandwidth allocation, the call request
is accepted if the sum of currently used bandwidth and
the bandwidth needed for new connection does not exceed
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the bandwidth allocated for QoS traffic. For instance, the
AC algorithm may work accordingly to the formula:
Bwnew +
N
∑
i=1
Bwi ≤C , (1)
where:
N – number of running connection,
Bwnew – bandwidth requested for a new connection,
Bw j – bandwidth used by ith connection, i = 1, . . . , N.
The acceptance decision is made only when formula (1) is
satisfied. It should be noticed that this formula is executed
each time when new call is submitted to the system and
this causes that delay appears in setting the connection,
even when the traffic is low.
The investigated in the paper approach assumes that for
new calls we invoke the AC depending on the current traffic
load. The proposed mechanism is based on the following
principles (see Fig. 1):
• All requests are accepted when current load (or
other specified but representative parameter) is be-
low a given threshold, say thr1.
• Acceptance of new call demands AC decision when
load carried by the link exceeds the threshold thr1.
• The invocation of AC is again stopped when the load
decreases to a given threshold, say thr2 (thr1 ≥ thr2).
Similar mechanism as above was proposed in [2, 3], for
handling TCP flows by implicit AC.
Fig. 1. Areas when the AC function is invoked.
In AC-T strategy, AC function is executed when current
load – for simplicity, represented by the number of running
connections N – exceeds predefined threshold trsh1. In this
case, a new connection is admitted only if:
(N +1)≤ Nmax , (2)
where:
N – number of running connections,
Nmax – maximum number of simultaneous connections
allowed by the AC.
Assuming that each call requests the effective band-
width R (homogenous traffic sources case) the Nmax is
calculated as:
Nmax =
C
R
, (3)
where:
C – the link capacity.
3. Disadvantages of AC-T
We assume that in proposed approach the AC decision is
based on information gathered from measurements. The
usual problem of such approach is that accuracy of per-
forming AC strictly depends on credibility of measurement
process. In real networks the data for AC function are pro-
vided by measurement subsystem after some delay, always
greater than zero. Let us name this measurement delay
as D. It is likely that in time interval D, there may be
a number of connections accepted violating link capacity
Eq. (1) or a connection with large bandwidth request may
be admitted, consuming or exceeding remaining capacity
Eq. (2). So the probability of exceeding link limit Nmax is
non-zero:
Pr
{
N > Nmax
}
≤ ε ; ε ≥ 0 . (4)
The objective of AC-T performing is to keep as close
to 0 as possible. The best quality is offered to a user if
ε = 0. This state may be reached when there is no mea-
surement delay, i.e., D = 0. In proposed approaches, where
we assume that D is non-zero, the degradation of QoS is
expected, as depicted in Fig. 2. The shadowed region cor-
Fig. 2. The impact of measurement delay D on performance of
AC function.
responds to expected deterioration of running connections
quality, e.g., increase of packet losses or packet transfer
delay.
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4. Simulation model
Let us consider a simple queuing system with single server
of capacity C and infinite buffer B. The traffic submitted to
this system may come from a number of users each of them
requesting specified link bit rates. Assuming that each con-
nection requests bit rate equal to its effective bandwidth R
(homogenous case), we get simulation model with Nmax
available channels each of R bitrate as depicted in Fig. 3,
where Nmax is calculated, e.g., from Eq. (3).
Fig. 3. Simulation model of the link with capacity of Nmax
connections.
The impact of measurements on AC decision were simu-
lated by introducing the delay parameter D in the simulator.
As pointed in the previous section, this parameter reflects
the time after which the information about current link load
is available for AC function.
5. Effectiveness criteria
Three parameters were taken into account for making an
evaluation of the discussed approach for performing AC-T.
Accepted call ratio (ACR), defined as a ratio of calls ac-
cepted by AC to the total number of submitted calls:
ACR = accepted calls
call attempts . (5)
Let us remark that the ACR is strictly related to the ratio
of successfully completed calls, if we do not consider the
number of unfinished calls at the end of the observation
time interval.
Now, let us define the QoS experienced by the user as a per-
centage of connection time when QoS degradation is ob-
served. Mostly, this happens when the number of running
connections is greater than Nmax and, as a consequence,
the offered load is greater than the link capacity. Thus we
introduce two next parameters for characterising the QoS
degradation level: degradation time ratio and cumulative
degradation time ratio.
Degradation time ratio (DTR) corresponds to the obser-
vation of a single connection duration time tC and repre-
sents the part of tC when we have more than Nmax running
connections in the system (jointly with the connection in
question). In general, the Nmax may be exceeded several
times during connection time tC (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. Time intervals when QoS of the connection is degraded.
Thus, for the jth connection, the DTR is calculated as a sum
of all time intervals when N > Nmax, limited for jth con-
nection duration time tC j:
DT R j =
∑
k
tDk
tC j
; k = 1, 2, . . . (6)
where:
tDk – kth time interval of jth connection when the num-
ber of admitted connections is greater than Nmax.
Notice that if degradation time is equal or greater than
connection duration time then DTR becomes 1.
Cumulative degradation time ratio (CDTR) is defined as
the ratio of time when capacity limit Nmax is exceeded to
the total time of observation:
tN>Nmax
T
, (7)
where:
tN>Nmax – time interval when in the system there are
more than Nmax running connections,
T – time of observation.
The same effectiveness metric as above was proposed in,
e.g., [4].
6. Numerical results
In this section we present the exemplary numerical results
showing the performance evaluation of the proposed strat-
egy and compare it with the traditional admission con-
trol strategy, named AC. The simulation tests were carried
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under assumption of Poissonian calls arrival process with
rate varied from 50 to 120 calls/s and exponential service
time distribution normalised to 1. All calls required the
same bandwidth, so the link capacity could be expressed
by the maximum number of simultaneously running con-
nections (see Eq. (3)). The capacity allocated for both of
strategies was the same. The rest of parameters were set as
follows:
– link capacity allocated Nmax 100 connections,
– thresholds trsh1 = trsh2 = trsh,
– measurement delay D = 0.1; 1; 5 s.
At first, the comparison of accepted calls ratio versus load
was performed. The numerical results of the test are shown
in Figs. 5 and 6. The accepted calls ratio differs depending
on the chosen strategy. For AC-T the resulting ACR factor
is approximately the same as we can get from AC. The
reason is that AC-T strategy uses accurate information about
link load, when the link utilisation exceeds threshold trsh,
here 0.8 of link capacity.
Fig. 5. Accepted calls ratio versus load for trsh = 0.8 and D = 5 s.
Fig. 6. Accepted calls ratio versus load for trsh = 0.8 and
D = 0.1 s.
Figures 7 and 8 show the impact of threshold value on
efficiency of proposed strategies. Notice that for AC-T
the ACR is close to the received values for accurate
AC strategy (see Fig. 7). For more accurate measurements,
i.e., smaller D, the resulting ACR for AC-T is very close
to the reference values (see Fig. 8). Comparing Figs. 7
and 8 we can see that there are more admitted connections
when D increases but with less respect to available link
capacity.
Fig. 7. Accepted calls ratio versus threshold for ρ = 1.2 and
D = 5 s.
Fig. 8. Accepted calls ratio versus threshold for ρ = 1.2 and
D = 0.1 s.
Fig. 9. Cumulative degradation time ratio versus load for
trsh = 0.8 and D = 5 s (note: no events were observed for AC).
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Next, the evaluation of CDTR was performed. As we could
expect, CDTR parameter is affected by the accuracy of mea-
surements. The simulation results for inaccurate measure-
ments are depicted in Fig. 9. The resulting CDTR is rel-
atively high, but the degradation ratio improves to 10−3
when link load exceeds threshold set to trsh = 0.8, i.e., the
precise AC function is triggered. Note, that degradation
concerns all running connections.
In the case of more accurate measurements, for D = 0.1 s,
we observe negligible degradation level, that is less
than 10−7 (not shown in the figure).
7. Conclusions
The paper presented and evaluated the approach to facili-
tate AC function in packet switched networks. It appears
that we do not need to invoke the AC each time new call
is submitted and we are able to provide QoS guarantees
at the assumed level. The effectiveness of proposed AC-T
algorithm was evaluated by simulations and compared with
hypothetical, accurate AC algorithm, working according
to M/M/N/N model.
Anyway, for effective implementation of the strategy AC-T
we need to assure that the measurement delay is not too
large. The sensitivity of proposed strategies on measure-
ments accuracy can be seen as a trade-off to expected de-
crease of signaling overhead.
In further work we focus on developing the rule to assign
proper threshold values, which seems as a way to manage
the measurement issues.
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Paper Performance evaluation
of the multiple output queueing switch
with diﬀerent buﬀer arrangements strategy
Grzegorz Danilewicz, Wojciech Kabaciński, Janusz Kleban, Damian Parniewicz,
and Patryk Dąbrowski
Abstract— Performance evaluation of the multiple output
queueing (MOQ) switch recently proposed by us is discussed
in this paper. In the MOQ switch both the switch fabric and
buﬀers can operate at the same speed as input and output
ports. This solution does not need any speedup in the switch
fabric as well as any matching algorithms between inputs and
outputs. In this paper new performance measures for the
proposed MOQ switch are evaluated. The simulation studies
have been carried out for switches with diﬀerent buﬀer ar-
rangements strategy and of capacity 2× 2, 4× 4, 8× 8, 16× 16
and 32× 32, and under selected traﬃc patterns. The simula-
tions results are also compared with OQ switches of the same
sizes.
Keywords— packet switching, switching fabric, multiple output
queueing.
1. Introduction
The tremendous increase in the speed of data transport on
optical ﬁbers has caused a need of deploying next gen-
eration network nodes (switches/routers) with high-speed
interfaces and large switching capacity. The challenges of
building new network nodes include: implementing a large
capacity switch fabric providing high-speed interconnec-
tion and devising a fast arbitration scheme resolving out-
put contention problems. One of constrains that limits
the switching capacity is the speed of memories used for
buﬀering packets to resolve contention resolution in packet
switches. Buﬀers can be placed on inputs, outputs, inputs
and outputs, and/or within the switch fabric. Depending
on the buﬀer placement respective switches are called in-
put queued (IQ), output queued (OQ), combined input and
output queued (CIOQ) and combined input and crosspoint
queued (CICQ) [1].
In [2] we have proposed a new switch architecture which
uses multiple output queueing (MOQ). In this architecture
buﬀers are located at output ports and are divided into
N separate queues. Each of N queues in one output port
stores packets from one input port. We assume, that ﬁxed-
length switching technology is used, i.e., variable-length
packets are segmented into ﬁxed-length packets, called time
slots or cells, at inputs and reassembled at the outputs. We
will use terms cell and packet interchangeably further on.
In the proposed architecture at most one packet is to be
written to the one output queue in one time slot. There-
fore, the memory speed is equal to the line speed, but the
performance of the switch is very similar to those of OQ
switch. The proposed architecture is very promising and
looks attractive for constructing high-capacity high-speed
packet switches. In this paper new results of simulation
studies carried out for the MOQ switch with diﬀerent buﬀer
arrangements strategy and selected traﬃc patterns are pre-
sented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
the general switch architecture proposed in [2] is reminded.
In the next section the parameters of simulation researches
are explained. Then performance measures for the pro-
posed switch architecture with diﬀerent buﬀer arrangements
strategy under diﬀerent traﬃc patterns are presented and
compared with results obtained for OQ. Then we come to
conclusions.
2. The switch architecture
The detailed description of MOQ switch architecture is
given in [2]. In this switch output queues are located at
output side of the switch. To reduce the memory speed an
output buﬀer at each output port is divided into N separate
queues. Each queue stores packets directed to the output
only form one input. In this way this architecture is similar
to the virtual output queueing (VOQ) switch, but multiple
buﬀers are located at output ports not at input ports. The
general architecture of the switch is shown in Fig. 1. The
switch consists of N input ports, N output ports and the
switch fabric. Input and output ports can be implemented
on separated ingress and egress cards or they may be placed
on one line card. At the output port the buﬀer memory is
divided into N separate queues. Each queue stores packets
directed from one input port. The output queue denoted
by OQ j,i at the output port j stores packets directed to
this output port from input i. At one time slot each input
port can send at most one packet and each output port can
receive up to N packets, each from diﬀerent input ports.
Therefore, these packets can be simultaneously written
to N queues.
The main advantage of these architecture is that it can op-
erate at the same speed as input and output ports, and
the lack of arbitration logic, which decides which pack-
ets from inputs will be transferred through the switch fab-
ric to output ports (this arbitration mechanism is needed
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in VOQ switches). However, since we have N queues in
each output port, it is necessary to use an output arbiter,
which chooses a packet to be sent to the output line. We
propose to use round-robin scheme, which is widely used
because of its fairness. The switch fabric in the proposed
switch should have a capacity of N ×N2 and should be
nonblocking at the packet level.
Fig. 1. The switch architecture with multiple output queueing.
In [2] we have shown that the MOQ switch has the hard-
ware and wiring complexity similar to the VOQ switch,
but for uniform traﬃc its performance is very similar to
the OQ switch. In this paper more research results are
given for uniformly and non-uniformly distributed traﬃcs.
3. Buﬀer arrangements
Buﬀers in output ports are arranged into N separate queues.
When N packets from N input ports are directed to one out-
put port in the same time slot, each packet is written to the
diﬀerent queues. Therefore, the memory speed is the same
as the line speed. Buﬀers may be arranged as separate
queues with independent write pointers or as a memory
bank with one pointer which points the same memory cells
in each queue. The implementation of this two buﬀer ar-
rangements strategies in hardware can inﬂuence the costs
of MOQ switch.
Packets from N queues in each output port are read out
using the round-robin algorithm. When independent write
pointers are used, the round-robin pointer, denoted by RR
(Fig. 1), is moved to the queue next to those read out in
the previous time slot. When packets are written to the
same position of the buﬀers (one write pointer is used),
the operation of RR is modiﬁed in such a way, that when
all packets from the same position are already read out,
the RR is set back to 0. The operation of these two ar-
rangements will be described by means of the following
example.
In the ﬁrst case the separate pointer is assign to each
queue. This pointer, denoted by MPj,i, points the end of
queue OQ j,i, where the next incoming packet to output j
from input i will be written to. The example for output x
is shown in Fig. 2. It is assumed that all queues are empty
at the beginning of the ﬁrst time slot. Pointers are shown
by arrows which show the state of the pointers at the end
of respective time slots. In the ﬁrst time slot two packets
(numbered 1 and 2) from inputs 0 and 1 arrive to the con-
sidered output x. The round-robin pointer (RR) is set to 0
(the head of line blocking (HOL) packet from OQx,0 has the
highest priority). Since buﬀer OQx,0 is empty, the packet
from input 0 is immediately directed to the output, the RR
pointer is set to 1, and packet 2 is stored in OQx,1. The
state of RR at the end of the time slot is shown in Fig. 2.
The pointer of OQx,1 is moved to the next memory cell.
In the next time slot packets from inputs 0, 1 and 3 ar-
rive (numbered 3, 4, and 5, respectively). They are stored
in respective queues, while packet 2 from OQx,1 is sent
out. During the third time slot packets 6, 7 and 8 arrive
from inputs 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Since RR is now set
to 2 and buﬀer OQx,2 is empty, packet 7 is sent directly
to the output, while packets 6 and 8 are stored in OQx,1
and OQx,3. In the next time slot packet 5 will be sent out
from OQx,3. The sequence of packets from the same input
port is preserve.
In the second case there is one pointer for all queues. This
pointer, denoted by MPj, points to the memory cells in
all queues of output j, where the next incoming packets
will be written to. The example is shown in Fig. 3. In
the ﬁrst time slot two packets (numbered 1 and 2) from
inputs 0 and 1 arrive to the considered output x. The round-
robin pointer (RR) is set to 0 (the HOL packet from OQx,0
has the highest priority). Since buﬀer OQx,0 is empty, the
packet from input 0 is immediately directed to the output,
packet 2 is stored in OQx,1, the MPx is moved to the next
memory cells in all queues (shown by arrows in Fig. 3),
and the RR pointer is set to 1 (here also the state of RR
is shown et the end of the time slot). In the next time
slot packets from inputs 0, 1 and 3 arrive (numbered 3, 4,
and 5, respectively). They are stored in the second memory
cell of respective queues, while packet 2 from OQx,1 is sent
out. After this packet is read out, there is no any packet
in the ﬁrst memory cell in all queues. Therefore, the next
cells in the queues are moved to the HOL position, and
the RR is set to 0. During the third time slot packets 6, 7
and 8 arrive from inputs 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Since
RR is now set to 0, packet 3 from OQx,0 is sent to the
output, while new packets are written to the buﬀer. In the
next three time slots packets 4, 5, and 6 will be sent out
from OQx,1, OQx,3, and OQx,1, respectively.
In this second approach all packets which arrive to the given
output are written in the same position of each buﬀer. So
we can use only such positions where all memory cells
are empty. When in the given time slot less than N pack-
ets arrive to the output, some memory cells will be empty
and they could not be used to store packets until all packet
in the same position of all buﬀers are read out. There-
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Fig. 2. The example of buﬀer operation with separate pointers.
Fig. 3. The example of buﬀer operation with one pointer.
fore, the memory is not used as eﬃciently as in the ﬁrst
approach.
4. Simulation experiments
4.1. Packet arrival models
The Bernoulli arrival model is considered in the paper. In
this arrival model cells arrive at each input in a slot-by-slot
manner. Under Bernoulli arrival process, the probability
that there is a cell arriving in each time slot is identical
and is independent of any other slot. The probability that
cell may arrive in a time slot is denoted by p and is referred
to as the load of the input [3]. This kind of traﬃc deﬁnes
a memoryless random arrival pattern.
4.2. Traffic distribution models
We consider several traﬃc distribution models which de-
termines the probability that a cell which arrive in an input
will be directed to the certain output. The considered traﬃc
models are:
Uniformly distributed traﬃc – this type of traﬃc is
the most commonly used traﬃc proﬁle test in the litera-
ture [4–6]. In a uniformly distributed traﬃc probability pi j
that packet from input i will be directed to output j is uni-
formly distributed through all outputs, i.e.,
pi j = p/N ∀i, j. (1)
Non-uniformly distributed traﬃc – in this traﬃc model
some outputs have a higher probability of being selected,
and respective probability pi j was calculated according to
the following equation [1]:
pi j =



p
2
for i = j
p
2(N−1)
for i 6= j .
(2)
Diagonally distributed traﬃc – in this model the traf-
ﬁc is concentrated in two diagonals of the traﬃc matrix,
and the probability that a packet will be directed to any
of the two outputs is equal to p/2 [4–7]. This loading is
skewed in the sense that input i has packets only for out-
puts i and |i+1|, where |k| denotes the modulo N operation
(|k|= k mod N).
Log-diagonally distributed traﬃc – for a log-diagonally
distributed traﬃc, the traﬃc matrix is deﬁned by equa-
tion [4, 6]:
pi j = 2pi| j+1| (3)
and ∑i pi j = p. (4)
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For example, the load distribution at input 1 across out-
puts is
p1 j = 2N− j p/(2N −1) . (5)
Lin-diagonally distributed traﬃc – this traﬃc is a fur-
ther modiﬁcation of diagonally distributed traﬃc. Lin-
diagonally distributed traﬃc can be deﬁned as
pd = p(N−d)
/
(N(N +1)/2) (6)
with d = 0, ...,N − 1, then pi j = pd if j = |i + d|N . This
traﬃc model is an intermediate case between the uniformly
and log-diagonally distributed traﬃcs in which the load
decreases linearly from one diagonal to the other [8].
5. Performance evaluation
In this section performance evaluation of the MOQ switch
will be presented and compared with OQ switches. Simu-
lation results indicate that mean time delay (MTD in time
slots) and cell lose probability for MOQ switches with dif-
ferent buﬀer arrangements strategy are very similar and
diﬀerences are unnoticeable. Thus only results for separate
pointers are presented. The results have been obtained for
switches of diﬀerent sizes: 2×2, 4×4, 8×8, 16×16, and
32×32. The results for switches of diﬀerent sizes are very
similar in shapes. The adopted buﬀer size assures — for
each value of traﬃc load — stable values of MTD (the
application of larger buﬀers do not lead to increase this
Fig. 4. The MTD for Bernoulli arrivals with diﬀerent distributed
traﬃc in a 16× 16 switch with MOQ (L = 16) and OQ (L =
inﬁnity).
waiting time). For OQ switch we have assumed that the
buﬀer size is inﬁnity. Results for OQ will be presented
only for Bernoulli arrivals and uniformly distributed traﬃc
and will be obtained from calculations based on formulas
given in [3].
In Fig. 4 diﬀerent traﬃc distribution models are compared
in 16×16 MOQ switch, where buﬀer size is equal to 16.
The highest MTD in MOQ switch is observed for uniformly
distributed traﬃc. This kind of traﬃc gives similar MTD
values for MOQ and OQ switches but MOQ is slightly
better.
The MTD in MOQ switches of diﬀerent sizes versus p for
uniform traﬃc and L = 16 is plotted in Fig. 5. It can be
seen that when the switch size is growing the MTD also
grows but very slowly. This delay is almost the same as the
theoretical MTD calculated for OQ switches of the same
capacities.
Fig. 5. The MTD for Bernoulli arrivals with uniformly dis-
tributed traﬃc and for diﬀerent capacities of MOQ (L = 16) and
OQ switches (L = inﬁnity).
Another important performance measure for packet
switches is the cell loss probability (CLP). Figure 6 com-
pares CLP obtained for MOQ switch with the results calcu-
lated for the OQ switch. CLP for OQ switch is calculated
from formula CLP = 1− (ρ0/p), where p is the oﬀered
load. Proof of this formula can be found in [3]. It is intu-
itively clear, that the proposed switch architecture requires
greater total number of memory cells (N buﬀers for each
output port) in order to keep the same value of CLP param-
eter as in the case of switches with single output queue for
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Fig. 6. The CLP for Bernoulli arrivals with diﬀerent distributed
traﬃc and for diﬀerent lengths of buﬀers in MOQ and OQ 16×16
switches.
each output port. From Fig. 6 it can be seen that when the
length of each buﬀer is equal to the same value (it means
that in OQ we use L memory cells for one output while
in MOQ we use N×L memory cells for one output) then
CLP in MOQ switch is about one order of magnitude better
than CLP in OQ switch. CLP for long buﬀers (L = 16) is
practically unnoticeably in our simulations.
6. Conclusions
We have presented the packet switch architecture which
uses multiple output queueing and its performance under
diﬀerent traﬃc patterns. Our studies lead us to conclusion
that buﬀer arrangements strategy is only important for the
practical switch implementation not for performance of the
switch fabric. The hardware complexity of MOQ architec-
ture is very similar to VOQ switch but its performance is
very comparable to OQ switch. The MTD is the same for
both MOQ and OQ architectures for uniformly distributed
traﬃc. The CLP is better for MOQ than for OQ, how-
ever, N times more memory cells are used in the MOQ
switch architecture. The MOQ architecture is also very
promising since it can naturally support multicast traﬃc. It
should be also noted, that the MOQ switch can be also mod-
iﬁed to support diﬀerent traﬃc priorities. Each of N output
buﬀers of each output port can be further divided to sup-
port diﬀerent packet priorities. Evaluation of such switch
architecture is also the subject of further studies.
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Regular paper The signal to noise ratio
in the differential cryptanalysis of 9 rounds
of data encryption standard
Michał Misztal
Abstract— There is presented the differential cryptanalysis
method of attack on data encryption standard (DES) reduced
to 9 rounds. More precise estimation than that of Biham and
Shamir of the signal to noise (S/N ) ratio is obtained. Also,
method of using the ratio in calculation of required number
of plaintexts is suggested. There are given results (time of per-
formance) and implementation’s issues of practical realisation
of this attack.
Keywords— block cipher DES, differential cryptanalysis, substi-
tution boxes, S/N ratio.
1. Introduction
Diﬀerential cryptanalysis and its modiﬁcations (like for
instance impossible diﬀerentials) are the most powerful
method of attacks on the popular symmetric cryptosys-
tems – block ciphers. The idea of diﬀerential cryptanalysis
was introduced in 1991 and applied to the former data en-
cryption standard (DES). At present every newly designed
block cipher must be at once evaluate due to resistance to
the diﬀerential attack. Hence diﬀerential attacks on con-
temporary block ciphers are possible only in theory or for
small number of rounds [1]. However diﬀerential crypt-
analysis could be still improved by applying in practice to
some well-known ciphers like mentioned DES.
This article is the continuation of paper [2], in which prac-
tical attack with diﬀerential cryptanalysis on DES cipher
reduced to 8 rounds was performed. In the introduction
of that paper it was stated that attack on more than 6 or
8 rounds of DES requires too much amount of data (en-
cryption of too many plaintexts) to be preformed in prac-
tice. Due to increasing of computational power of com-
puters (processor speed, capacity of operational and disc
memory) attacks which were considered as only theoret-
ical become now possible in practice. At the beginning
of 90’s, when idea of diﬀerential cryptanalysis was born,
its inventors did not have possibility to verify their theo-
ries in practice. Simple attacks on 3 or 4 rounds of DES
were possible but for more rounds only theoretical estima-
tion of required amount of data and complexity time was
done. Practical attack on 8 rounds of DES [2] showed
that many of these theoretical estimations diﬀer from re-
ality (for example 25 000 pairs is far to small to suc-
ceed). At presence thanks to available processors and
especially to capacity of memory (cf. Section 5) we can
perform attack even on 9 rounds. Thanks to that we can
do some experiments and obtain practical, precise results
and than compare them to theory. It is the main aim of
this paper.
We start from the brief recollection of idea of diﬀerential
cryptanalysis and the scheme of DES cipher. More details
can be found in given references [2–4]. In Section 4 we
show how to calculate the S/N ratio of counting scheme
of attack on 9 round of DES in more precise way than up
to now. We also suggest a method of using the ratio in
calculation of required number of plaintexts. We theoreti-
cally calculate the eﬃcacy of ﬁltration of wrong pairs and
compare it to practice. In Section 5 the implementation’s
issues of practical realisation of this attack are given. At
the end we present results (running time and eﬃcacy) of
performed cryptanalysis.
2. The DES algorithm
The data encryption standard algorithm was the encryption
standard since year 1977. In year 2001 it was replaced
by chosen in contest block cipher Rijndael, which became
advanced encryption standard (AES).
The DES algorithm is a block cipher, which in standard
version encrypts 64-bit block of plaintext to 64-bit block
of ciphertext with 64-bit key. Due to standard actual length
of key is only 56-bits and 8 bits are extra bits used only
for parity check. Algorithm consists of 16 rounds and is
based on structure called Feistel’s network. In every round
left half of block is xored with result of f function ap-
plied to right half of block. Then in every round but
last both halves are swapped. Hence f function is main
element of every round. It transforms half of encrypted
block (32-bits) with 48-bit subkey of round. Every sub-
key is obtained from main key by algorithm called key
schedule.
The f function uses two permutations E and P and also
8 nonlinear mappings called substitution tables or substi-
tution boxes (brieﬂy s-boxes). Extending permutation E
transforms 32-bit block to 48-bit block. Permutation P
transforms 32-bit block to 32-bit block. In every s-box
6-bit input is transformed to 4-bit output. General scheme
of algorithm and scheme of f function are presented in
Figs. 1 and 2. Key schedule, permutations E and P and all
eight s-boxes can be found in given references.
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Fig. 1. Scheme of DES algorithm.
Fig. 2. Scheme of f function.
The DES algorithm reduced to n rounds is an algorithm in
which two changes were made:
– number of rounds was reduced from 16 to n, but in
the nth (last) round there is no swapping of halves,
like after 16th round in standard version;
– permutations IP and IP−1 were removed due to their
insigniﬁcancy to cryptanalysis.
3. Diﬀerential cryptanalysis
The diﬀerential cryptanalysis was introduced in year 1991
by Biham and Shamir [3] as modern method of cryptanal-
ysis of DES. At least in theory this method is better than
exhaustive search, it means testing all possible 256 keys.
It is based on dependency between pairs of plaintexts with
certain diﬀerence (in term of XOR) and diﬀerences of
their ciphertexts. From above the name “diﬀerential” was
derived. It is a chosen plaintext (CPA) type of crypt-
analysis.
Basic idea of diﬀerential cryptanalysis is observation of
behaviour of pair of blocks with certain diﬀerence trans-
formed through rounds of cipher rather than single block.
For linear mappings like permutations, XOR operations
the diﬀerence of pair of blocks behaves in deterministic
way, like single block. The most important thing is that
XOR with unknown key does not change this diﬀerence.
If two arbitrary blocks X and X∗ with known diﬀerence
X ′ = X⊕X∗ are XORed with unknown key K then the new
values of this blocks X ⊕K and X∗⊕K are unknown but
their diﬀerence X ′ remains the same. It happens because
of property of XOR operation in which K ⊕K = 0. The
only problem during analysis of propagation of diﬀerences
is the application of nonlinear mappings, i.e., s-boxes. For
s-boxes we can ﬁnd input and output diﬀerence, which oc-
curs more frequently than others, i.e., with higher probabil-
ity. However it makes that diﬀerential cryptanalysis is only
probabilistic method. Its results depend on certain value
of key, chosen plaintext and it requires suﬃciently many
tries to ﬁnd correct key. To ﬁnd the best input – output
diﬀerence propagations of s-boxes the so-called XOR pro-
ﬁles are constructed. The XOR proﬁle of s-box is a table,
which shows how many certain input diﬀerence goes to
certain output diﬀerence. XOR proﬁles are discussed also
in the next section.
If we know or we can predict behaviour of diﬀerences in
individual operations and rounds, then we can ﬁnd input
diﬀerence, i.e., diﬀerence of two plaintexts which after
ﬁrst round goes to certain diﬀerence with some probabil-
ity, which subsequently after second round goes to another
diﬀerence with some probability and so on. This sequence
of successive diﬀerences between successive rounds from
plaintext diﬀerence to ciphertext diﬀerence is called dif-
ferential characteristic. Every characteristic has its prob-
ability, which is calculated as product of probabilities
of diﬀerence propagations for all rounds. Main problem
in diﬀerential cryptanalysis is to ﬁnd “good” diﬀerential
characteristic, which means characteristic with high prob-
ability.
Only diﬀerential characteristic with suﬃciently high proba-
bility makes possible to perform a diﬀerential attack. If we
have such characteristic we choose pairs of plaintexts with
diﬀerence given by this characteristic and we obtain their
ciphertexts. Then we try to discard pairs, which do not fol-
low our characteristic. This process we call ﬁltration. We
know only plaintext and ciphertext diﬀerence and we do not
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know diﬀerence between individual rounds, because cipher
is a black box for us. Hence we cannot be sure which pairs
are good, i.e., follow our characteristic and which pairs are
wrong and only look like they follow this characteristic. In
the ﬁltration process we can analyse ciphertext diﬀerence
and discard pairs, which are wrong for sure. All good pairs
will survive this ﬁltration but some number of wrong pairs
will survive as well.
After ﬁltration for every non-discarded pair we may ﬁnd
possible subkeys for example last or ﬁrst round or parts of
these subkeys (for example 30 out of 48 bits) in procedure
called key recovery. Detailed scheme of this procedure can
be found in [3] or [2]. Every pair suggests several sub-
keys. Good pair suggests exactly one good subkey and few
wrong subkeys. Wrong pair suggests only wrong subkeys.
Hence we have to count for every non-discarded pair how
many times every subkey occurred. For suﬃcient number
of analysed pairs the correct subkey should be the most fre-
quently appeared subkey. The indicator of how many times
the correct subkey is more frequent than other subkeys is
signal to noise (S/N) ratio. Precise calculation of this pa-
rameter can inform us about chances of success of certain
attack. Due to this parameter we can also determine the
number of pairs required to assure success of the attack. In
the next section we discuss how to calculate the S/N ratio
in attack on 9 rounds DES and how to determine the re-
quired number of pairs from the S/N ratio. Given method
is general and could be used in other attacks and for other
ciphers.
4. The signal to noise ratio in attack
on 9 rounds of DES
4.1. Differential characteristic and its probability
To attack algorithm DES reduced to 9 rounds we use the
following 6-round diﬀerential characteristic – see Fig. 3.
The characteristic is taken from [3] and it is the best diﬀer-
ential characteristic of DES found up to now. Its probability
is a product of probabilities of 6 successive rounds and it
is equal to:
p =
(12·14·16)·1 ·(10·16)·1 · (10·16)·1
643 ·4 ·642 ·642 ·4 =
217 ·525
246
=
525
229
≈ 9.7788870334625244140625 ·10−7
≈
1
1000000 .
With this characteristic we can attack 9 rounds of data
encryption standard by adding three more rounds (so-cal-
led 3R attack). Due to the characteristic for good pairs
we have:
R′6 = 40 5C 00 00x ,
hence for ﬁve s-boxes: S2, S5, S6, S7, S8:
S′E7 = S′I7 = 0 and S′O7 = 0,
where:
S′E7 means 6-bit diﬀerence after permutation E in
7th round,
S′I7 means 6-bit diﬀerence before s-boxes layer in
7th round,
S′O7 means 4-bit diﬀerence after s-boxes layer in
7th round.
Due to scheme of DES for these s-boxes we have the fol-
lowing relation:
f (R8, K9)′ = C′L⊕R′5⊕ f (R6, K7) .
The characteristic allows us to obtain for these 5 s-boxes
input and output in 9th round required for key recov-
ery procedure. By applying the characteristic and the key
recovery procedure for one round (9th in that case) we
obtain 5 (s-boxes) · 6 bits = 30 bits of subkey K9, and
30 bits of main key as well. Remaining 26 bits of main
key can be found by exhaustive search.
Fig. 3. Six-round characteristic.
Due to the probability of the characteristic only some frac-
tion of pairs will follow it. We know only the diﬀerence of
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plaintexts and corresponding diﬀerence of ciphertexts af-
ter 9 rounds so we cannot conﬁrm whether it is a good or
bad pair. But we can do some analysis for s-boxes S2, S5,
S6, S7 and S8. If for any s-box obtained input diﬀerence
does not go to obtained output diﬀerence, or equivalently
set of suggested subkeys is empty, than we know for sure
that analysed pair does not follow the characteristic and
should be discarded. Some number of wrong pairs can-
not be revealed and discarded in that way. Unﬁltered pairs
will suggest only wrong subkeys and they will provide only
disinformation noise. Also good pairs will suggest a few
wrong subkeys and exactly one correct subkey. To distin-
guish the correct subkey from the noise we count occur-
rences of all suggested subkeys. The correct subkey should
occurs more times than others wrong subkeys. The ques-
tion is how many pairs we need to analyse to distinguish the
correct subkey from the noise. To determine the number of
required pairs the S/N ratio is introduced. The parameter
estimates the ratio of the number of good pairs equals the
number of occurrences of the correct subkey (signal) to the
number of occurrence of all subkeys (noise).
4.2. The signal to noise ratio parameter
The S/N ratio of counting scheme is deﬁned as ratio of
the number of good pairs and average number of counts
of wrong subkeys in counting scheme. In other words the
parameter shows how many more times will the correct
subkey occur than any other subkey. The formula for
the S/N ratio is given below:
S/N = mp
mα
β
2k
=
2k p
αβ ,
where:
p – the probability of the characteristic,
k – the number of bits of counted subkeys,
α – the average number of subkeys suggested by one
analysed pair,
β – the ratio of analysed pairs to all pairs, an eﬃciency
of ﬁltration,
m – the number of decrypted pairs.
From the formula it is easy to see that:
– the S/N ratio is independent of the number of pairs
used in the attack,
– diﬀerent schemes of counting based on the same
characteristic but counting diﬀerent number of bits
of subkey have diﬀerent value of the S/N ratio.
The number of good pairs required to ﬁnd the correct sub-
key is a function of the S/N ratio parameter. For one s-box
of DES we assume k = 6, α = 4 (average number of 6-bits
subkeys suggested by one pair), β = 0.8 (average percent-
age of possible diﬀerence transitions in s-box).
With these values we can calculate the S/N ratio for the at-
tack on 9 rounds in the following way. We use key recovery
procedure for 5 s-boxes in the last round simultaneously;
hence we assume following values:
– k = 5 ·6 = 30 bits,
– αβ = 4 · 4 · 4 · 4 · 4 = 45 = 210 = 1024, the average
number of 30-bit subkeys suggested by one anal-
ysed pair; for every s-box we have in average four
6-bit subkeys, hence to obtain 30-bit subkey for ﬁve
s-boxes we have to determine all combinations of
these 6-bit subkeys.
The parameters α and β could be determined separately as
we will do later in the precise estimation of the S/N ratio,
and now we only determine their product like above. It is
easier now and as we will show it is also precise.
We know the probability of the characteristic and above
values of parameters so we can calculate the S/N ratio
now:
S/N =
230 ·
1
1000000
45
=
220
1000000
=
1048576
1000000 = 1.048576 ≈ 1 .
It was assumed in [3], that if the S/N is between 1 and 2,
then about 20–40 good pairs are suﬃcient. If the S/N is
high then only a few occurrences of right pairs are needed
to uniquely identify a right value of the subkey bits. If
the S/N is small the number of required pairs is big and
when S/N is less than 1 we never ﬁnd the correct subkey.
In that case the correct subkey occurs more rare than other
subkeys in average. Hence the maximum value in counter
is not the value of the correct subkey even for huge number
of pairs. In that case attack would be impossible.
In our attack the S/N is small but higher than 1, what
makes the attack possible at least in theory. We have to
determine the number of pairs needed to success of the at-
tack. According to [3] 30 good pairs are suﬃcient. Good
pair appears statistically one time per every 1 000 000 gen-
erated pairs, hence about 30 million pairs will be needed
to perform the attack and to uniquely identify a right value
of 30-bit subkey. Experiments have shown (cf. Section 6)
that above number of pairs is too small in general. Some-
times that number is suﬃcient but it happens too rarely.
We would like to determine the number of needed pairs,
which is suﬃcient to uniquely identify a right subkey in all
cases. 30 million, it is too small for sure. How many pairs
we need and how to determine this number in the clear and
faultless way? We will try to answer the question and we
will start from precise calculation of the S/N ratio.
4.3. Precise calculation of the signal to noise ratio
To determine the number of pairs needed to success of the
attack ﬁrst we have to calculate the S/N ratio in the most
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precise way. If this parameter is much higher than 1 a few
(3–4) pairs would be suﬃcient like in the attack on 4 or
6 rounds DES. But in the case of attack on 9 rounds DES
the ratio is only slightly higher than 1, so we have to cal-
culate it very precise. We will of course use the formula
given previously:
S/N = 2
k p
αβ .
Value of k remains unchanged: k = 30 but the probabil-
ity p is now exact value, i.e., p = 525229 . We have also as-
sumed diﬀerent values of α and β ., We start from β pa-
rameter, which expresses the proportion of the number of
analysed pairs to the number of all generated pairs, so it
is an eﬃciency of ﬁltration. Whole ﬁltration we can do
in the 3R attack is testing for all ﬁve s-boxes and check
whether input diﬀerence obtained from ciphertexts and the
characteristic may cause obtained output diﬀerence. If for
these input and output diﬀerences in appropriate XOR pro-
ﬁle it is zero entry then it means this input-output transi-
tion is impossible. If it happens even for one s-box out
of ﬁve we know for sure that this pair is wrong and we
discard it. Hence parameter β is a probability that for all
ﬁve s-boxes simultaneously the input-output diﬀerences are
possible. In average percentage of non-zero values in XOR
proﬁles of all s-boxes of DES is 0.8. For ﬁve s-boxes we
may assume β = 0.85 ≈ 0.32768, but it is not suﬃciently
precise for us. We have to look closer at XOR proﬁles of
s-boxes. In [3] percentages of non-zero values are given
for all 8 s-boxes. We have determined these percentages
with bigger precision. All results are given in Table 1.
Table 1
Percentage of non-zero values in XOR proﬁles of s-boxes
s-box Percentage [3] Precise values
S1 79.4 0.794921875
S2∗ 78.6 0.786132813
S3 79.6 0.796875000
S4 68.5 0.685546875
S5∗ 76.5 0.765625000
S6∗ 80.4 0.804687500
S7∗ 77.2 0.772460938
S8∗ 77.1 0.771484375
In our attack we deal only with 5 s-boxes (denoted ∗) so
parameter β is a product of corresponding values from the
table and it equals:
β = 0.288631 < 0.85.
Than we calculate value of α . Parameter α means the num-
ber of subkeys suggested by one analysed pair. It is the
average number of diﬀerent subkeys found by key recov-
ery algorithm for one non-discarded pair. To obtain α we
will again use XOR proﬁles. For individual s-box the aver-
age number of found subkeys is equal to average entry in
the XOR proﬁle of the s-box. It is equal 64 (the sum of
entries in every row) divided by 16 (the number of columns)
hence it is 4. But after ﬁltration we do not take impossible
transitions in to account. So we should calculate the aver-
age only from non-zero entries. The values of α calculated
in that way are given in Table 2. As we can see they are
diﬀerent for diﬀerent s-boxes.
Table 2
The average of non-zero entries in XOR proﬁle of s-boxes
s-box Average of non-zero values
S1 5.031941032
S2∗ 5.088198758
S3 5.019607843
S4 5.834757835
S5∗ 5.224489796
S6∗ 4.970873786
S7∗ 5.178255373
S8∗ 5.184810127
Similarly like for β , α is a product of values for ﬁve s-boxes
denoted by ∗ and it equals:
α = 3547.782689 .
Product of α and β is equal to αβ = 1024 = 45, so previous
estimation was also very precise. But the second method
is more universal; because it calculates values of α and β
separately, however it is also needs more work.
Now we know the values of all parameters so we can cal-
culate S/N again:
S/N =
230 ·
525
229
0.288631 ·3547.782689
=
1050
1024 = 1.025390625 .
This value is diﬀerent from previous on the third signiﬁ-
cant position although we actually have changed only the
probability p.
Very interesting thing is that experiments (cf. Section 6)
provide diﬀerent value of β parameter. We have anal-
ysed diﬀerent number of pairs and obtain the number of
pairs non-discarded in ﬁltration process. Proportion of these
numbers determines β .
From Table 3 we can see that value of the parameter is
rather constant. Small diﬀerences are consequences of
probabilistic behaviour of diﬀerential cryptanalysis. It is
also slightly diﬀerent from theoretically obtained value. It
may be explained as follows. We generate pairs of plain-
texts not actually in random. First plaintext from the pair
is generated randomly but second one depends on the char-
acteristic. Than pairs of ciphertexts are not random and
diﬀerential cryptanalysis can work at all. Theoretical es-
timation of β was obtained for fully random values. And
here this diﬀerence appears. About 1/p pairs are good and
survive ﬁltration for sure, some portion of pairs may follow
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the characteristic for a few rounds and have more chances
to survive ﬁltration then fully random ciphertexts. Hence
in practice more pairs remain after ﬁltration and parame-
ter β is bigger then theoretical estimation made for fully
random pairs.
Table 3
Parameter β obtained in experiments
No. β
1 0.2916292
2 0.2915709
3 0.2915562
4 0.2914597
5 0.2920615
6 0.2915714
Parameter α obtained in those experiments was accurate
with its theoretical value.
We put value of β provided by experiments to the formula
of the S/N and we have:
S/N =
230 ·
525
229
0.2915 ·3547.782689 = 1.015298465 .
Value of the S/N obtained in this way we will use in further
considerations.
4.4. The method of determination the number of pairs
needed to the attack based on the signal to noise
ratio
We have determined as precise as possible the S/N ra-
tio. Now we will use the ratio to estimate the number
of required pairs. If the S/N is much bigger then 1 we
can assume that even 3–4 good pairs are suﬃcient to suc-
cessful attack. But when the S/N is close to 1 like in
that case the number of required good pairs is much big-
ger. In-advance assumption that 20, 30 or 40 good pairs
are suﬃcient must be veriﬁed in certain attack. The at-
tack on 9 rounds of DES need more then suggested in [3]
30 or 40 good pairs to uniquely identify the correct key.
Sometimes these numbers are suﬃcient but it happens too
rarely. Rough estimation of eﬃciency of attack with these
numbers of pairs is smaller then 50%. So how many pairs
are needed to signiﬁcantly increase this eﬃciency?
We want to set the number of required pairs to be as small
as possible but to be suﬃcient to uniquely identify the cor-
rect key. To recall, found key is a value, which has occurred
the most frequently. It means that we search the counter of
occurrences of all keys for the maximum value. If a noise
is high the maximum value may not correspond to the cor-
rect key but some other key. The number of occurrences
of the correct key may be second or third or next value in
the counter. In that case attack ends with failure. In our
attack the S/N ratio is greater than 1 (and it is possible at
all) so increasing number of generated and analysed pairs
tends to increased number of occurrences of correct key.
That number increases faster than average number of oc-
currences of incorrect key (noise). So the number of pairs
to analyse should be suﬃciently big to assure that number
of occurrences of the correct key will be maximum value
in the counter. It means that number will be greater than
number of occurrences of all other keys with big probabil-
ity. Due to the probabilistic nature of our problem values in
the counter are diﬀerent in diﬀerent experiments. And we
can use only average numbers, which are easy to determine.
We cannot predict the maximum value of noise or signal in
the counter but we know in average how many good pairs
were analysed. Also we know that every good pair gives
one good key. We know the average value in the counter
(level of a noise) as well. Now we want to be sure that
number of occurrences of correct key would “stand out of
noise”. It means it would be greater even by 1 than other
values in the counter. Hence we have to set the number
of required pairs in order to the expected number of good
pairs and occurrences of good key as well be greater than
the expected average number in the counter. The expected
number of good pairs can be calculated as a product of
the number of all analysed pairs and the probability of the
characteristic: m · p. It is the numerator of the S/N ratio.
The expected average number in the counter can be calcu-
lated as: (m ·α ·β )/2k (the denominator of the S/N). Now
we ﬁnd such m that the numerator (m · p) is greater at least
by 1 than the denominator. We start with m = 30 000 000
because we know that value is too small. We assume step
5 million and check successive values of m. Results of our
searching are given in Table 4.
The ﬁrst row gives the number of pairs used in the at-
tack. The second counts the average number in the counter,
third – number of good pairs. The fourth row is a propor-
tion of above rows (row 2/row 3), so it is the S/N ratio
actually. The last row expresses the diﬀerence: row 3 –
row 2. As we can see the diﬀerence is greater than 1 for
m = 70 million and we end our search with that value. We
believe that in some sense the last row expresses the success
of attack with corresponding number of pairs.
Precise value of m can be also calculated by using the
S/N ratio. The number of occurrence of good key grows
faster than the average number in the counter by factor
equals to the S/N ratio. We want the signal be greater by
one than noise. We put the nominator to be by 1 greater
than the denominator, hence:
mp−
mp
S/N
> 1 ⇒
(S/N−1)mp
S/N
> 1 ⇒ m >
S/N
S/N−1
1
p
.
In that way we obtain the estimation on the number of
required pairs to successful attack:
m >
S/N
(S/N−1)p
.
As we can see, with the growth of the S/N ratio the num-
ber m tends to 1/p.
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Table 4
Results of searching for required number of pairs
1. Number of pairs m 30000000 35000000 40000000 45000000 50000000
2. Average in counter 28.89462 33.71038743 38.52616 43.34192669 48.15769633
3. Number good pairs 29.33666 34.22610462 39.11555 44.00499165 48.89443517
4. The S/N ratio 1.015298 1.015298465 1.015298 1.015298465 1.015298465
5. Diﬀerence 0.44204 0.51571719 0.58939 0.66306496 0.73673884
1. Number of pairs m 55000000 60000000 65000000 67866654 70000000
2. Average in counter 52.97346596 57.7892356 62.60500522 65.3660333 67.42077
3. Number good pairs 53.78387868 58.6733222 63.56276572 66.3660333 68.45221
4. The S/N ratio 1.015298465 1.015298465 1.015298465 1.015298465 1.015298
5. Diﬀerence 0.81041273 0.884087 0.95776049 1 1.03143
The estimation can be useful in every attack, especially
when the S/N ratio is close but greater than 1. Eﬃcacy
of attack with that number of pairs is very high (cf. Sec-
tion 6) but still less than 100%. Due to the probabilistic
nature of the problem an experiment in which that number
is too small always may happen. But now it will happen
rarely. In that case we of course can use more pairs.
In our attack we have:
m =
1.015298465 ·229
(1.015298465−1) ·525 = 67866653.95 .
Hence we need above 67 million pairs. It conﬁrms the
results given in the Table 4.
Using the above estimation we can make quite interest-
ing observation. Namely, if we use the estimation with
very ﬁrst calculated value of S/N ratio [3] we will obtain
m > 22074391.17. It means that for this value of the
S/N ratio 30 million pairs would be suﬃcient.
5. Implementation issues
Implementation and performance of considered attack is
possible now thanks to progress in computational power
of computers (processor speed, capacity of operational and
disc memory). But still there are some problems and re-
strictions we have to solve. Main problem is a size of
memory to store the counter.
We count the number of occurrences of all 30-bit subkeys,
so we need the counter, which consists 230 at least 8-bit
values. It requires operational memory of size 1 GB. In
the attack on 8 rounds of DES the problem was solved by
dividing it on two less complicated subproblems [2]. In
the case of 9 rounds this solution is impossible. Computer
with 1 GB of operational memory is still unavailable due
to high costs. The problem was solved on computer with
operational memory of size 256 MB by time-memory trade
oﬀ 256 MB of memory allows on using a counter with
228 elements. The space of 230 was divided on four separate
subspaces of size 228 depending on two most signiﬁcant bits
of 30-bit key. Whole process of counting keys is divided
on four substages.
In ﬁrst substage we generate required number of pairs.
Than we perform key recovery algorithm and save in tem-
porary ﬁle only non-discarded pairs (ciphertexts actually).
It requires 2 · β · m · 8 bytes of disc memory and for
m = 70 million it makes about 324 MB and now it is easily
available. In that smaller counter we put only keys with
the same two signiﬁcant bits equal for example 00. In the
counter we search for the maximum. If the distinct maxi-
mum exists we assume it corresponds with the correct key
and we end this stage. The distinct maximum means that
it is only one maximum value and the value is signiﬁcantly
greater than any others. In the other case we proceed to
next substage. We put into the new counter only keys with
the same two signiﬁcant bits equal now for example 01.
In the second substage we use saved in the ﬁrst substage
non-discarded pairs. We do not perform the ﬁltration
again what signiﬁcantly reducing the time of the substage.
Than we again search for the distinct maximum in the new
counter taking into account maximum value from the ﬁrst
counter. If the distinct maximum exists we ﬁnish with that
value of key. In the other case we proceed to third and
forth if it is needed. The time of that stage may diﬀer
signiﬁcantly with respect to the number of substages per-
formed until the key was found. In average we perform
two substages. That approach makes the issues of required
number of pairs very complicated. If the number appeared
too small increasing it is very troublesome and we must
repeat whole attack actually. As we can see it is very im-
portant to set the appropriate number of required pairs at
the beginning. From the other hand, the number should be
as small as possible to decrease the time of attack.
The second and very unexpected problem, which showed
out, was generating the pairs of plaintexts. As we stated
we need 70 million pairs, so we have to generate above
226 · 23 = 229 bytes in random. The period of standard
pseudorandom number generator in used programming lan-
guage (C++) should be 231, but for the least signiﬁcant
byte it is smaller and it is only 227 (it is a discovered error
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Table 5
First results
Number of generated
pairs [million]
Number of non-discarded
pairs
β Max in counter Number of occurrences
of correct key
Result
30 8743769 0.2914580 64 (4 times) 63 Failure
35 10202090 0.2914883 77 77 Success
35 10203548 0.2915299 73 59 Failure
35 10205025 0.2915721 81 81 Success
35 10204767 0.2915648 71 61 Failure
35 10203362 0.2915246 70 (3 times) 70 Failure
35 10200564 0.2914447 76 76 Success
35 10204390 0.2915537 73 (2 times) 64 Failure
35 10207181 0.2916337 72 (2 times) 59 Failure
35 10205876 0.2915965 75 48 Failure
35 10201090 0.2914597 73 60 Failure
40 11655712 0.2913928 88 88 Success
40 11658656 0.2914664 92 92 Success
40 11662246 0.2915562 87 87 Success
40 11661319 0.2915330 82 76 Failure
40 11665598 0.2916400 79 (2 times) 64 Failure
40 11662246 0.2915562 84 84 Success
50 14576501 0.2914666 99 99 Success
50 14573329 0.2916178 105 105 Success
50 14580889 0.2916178 98 80 Failure
50 14575285 0.2915057 95 88 Failure
50 14586415 0.2917283 109 109 Success
50 14576447 0.2915289 101 101 Success
50 14579432 0.2915886 94 85 Failure
50 14579003 0.2915801 100 100 Success
50 14575915 0.2915183 95 94 Failure
of compiler!). So we have to use our own pseudorandom
number generator with the suitable period, which generates
numbers with uniform distribution. We did not need any
cryptographically strong generator but only fast one so we
used ordinary linear feedback shift register (LFSR) with
length 64 bits, what made its period equals to 264−1 bits.
That problem is irrelevant from cryptanalytic point of view
but we would like to point out that in the case of such huge
amounts of data similar problems may completely warp the
results of the cryptanalysis.
6. Results
Now we present the results of performance of considered
attack. The attack was implemented in C++ language
in Borland C++ Builder 5 on a computer with processor
Celeron II 1.3 GHz and 320 MB of operational memory.
We used implementation of 9 rounds of DES running with
speed 3.2 million blocks per second what makes through-
output 200 Mbit/s.
We start with attacks with too small number of pairs. Ta-
ble 5 shows the results of attacks with 30–50 million pairs.
The ﬁrst column presents the number of generated pairs.
The second expresses the number of pairs, which survive
the ﬁltration. The third is a proportion of two previous
columns and it is an eﬃcacy of ﬁltration (parameter β ).
In the next column the maximum value in the counter is
given. The number in the parenthesis means how many
times the maximum appeared if more than one. The ﬁfth
column gives the number of occurrences of the correct key.
In the last column the result of the attack (success or fail-
ure) is given. The result can be derived from two previous
columns.
From the table we can roughly estimate the probability
of success of the attack. The probability of success of
attack with 30 or 35 million pairs is smaller than 1/3,
with 40 or 50 million pairs slightly exceeds 1/2.
Table 6 presents in similar way the results of attacks with
70 million pairs. Additionally the time of performance of
substages is given.
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Table 6
Main results
Number Number Time of substages Time of Time of Number
of all pairs of non-discarded β [s] II stage attack Max of occurrences Result
[million] pairs 1 2 3 4 [s] [s] of correct key
70 20411466 0.2915924 7391 4987 4977 – 138 17493 139 139 Success
70 20407887 0.2915412 7395 4979 4983 – 6 17363 144 144 Success
70 20400900 0.2914414 7374 – – – 245 7619 127 127 Success
70 20410516 0.2915788 7384 – – – 84 7468 134 134 Success
70 20408476 0.2915497 7363 – – – 29 7392 128 128 Success
70 20408331 0.2915476 7382 – – – 85 7467 145 145 Success
70 20402070 0.2914581 7358 4982 4948 6085 313 23686 121 116 Failure
70 20414410 0.2916344 7376 – – – 273 7649 149 149 Success
70 20411673 0.2915953 7384 4945 4955 4951 136 22371 143 143 Success
70 20404332 0.2914905 7360 4935 – – 72 12367 133 133 Success
70 20405427 0.2915061 7353 4938 – – 211 12502 132 132 Success
70 20414960 0.2916423 7389 4944 – – 155 12488 123 123 Success
70 20404748 0.2914964 7391 – – – 85 7476 133 133 Success
70 20409296 0.2915614 7353 4932 4927 – 89 17301 135 135 Success
70 20415691 0.2916527 7365 4916 – – 196 12477 148 148 Success
70 20408939 0.2915563 7455 – – – 17 7472 126 126 Success
70 20403624 0.2914803 6792 – – – 210 7002 151 151 Success
70 20409608 0.2915658 6804 4729 4707 4710 152 21102 119 118 Failure
70 20404448 0.2914921 6766 – – – 232 6998 121 – Failure
70 20412821 0.2916117 6768 – – – 182 6950 144 144 Success
70 20413305 0.2916186 6764 – – – 77 6841 152 152 Success
70 20404312 0.2914902 6772 – – – 13 6785 149 149 Success
70 20413398 0.2916200 6769 4709 4696 – 28 16202 146 146 Success
Average 0.2915574 7167 4892 4847 5249 132 11500 Succ./fail. 20/3
Lack of given time of any substage means that substage was
not necessary because the maximum was found in previ-
ous substage. The ﬁrst substage is always about 1.5 times
longer than others. It results from applied procedure of
counting keys. In the ﬁrst stage we generate all pairs, than
we perform the ﬁltration and save them. In next substages
we only analyse non-discarded pairs what is signiﬁcantly
faster.
As we can see only 3 out of 23 attacks have ended with fail-
ure. In the two ﬁrst cases all four substages were performed,
but in any of them distinct maximum was not found, and
the correct key occurred more rare than others. In the third
case distinct maximum was found but it did not correspond
to the correct key. The eﬃciency of the attack with 70 mil-
lion pairs we can consider as very high and close to 90%
even for a few dozen experiments.
After assuming that 70 million is the proper number of re-
quired pairs we can perform a full attack. It means after
ﬁnding the 30 bits of main key in the ﬁrst stage we can
ﬁnd remaining 26 bits by exhaustive search of space 226.
It was now a simple and fast task. The column “Time of
II stage” in Table 6 gives time (in seconds) of exhaustive
search that was needed to ﬁnd remaining 26 bits of main
key. As we can see that search takes not longer than 5 min-
utes. The column “Time of attack” gives a total time of the
attack calculated as the sum of ﬁves values in the previous
columns.
In the cases of ﬁrst two failures the correct key occurred too
less times to be found. So all four substages were performed
and entire search in the II stage (313 and 152 seconds), but
without success. Of course if ﬁrst 30 bits are wrong we
can never adjust the last 26 bits to get the correct key.
The last failure was of diﬀerent type. In the initial sub-
stages (in the ﬁrst in the certain case) a distinct maximum
was found, but it did not correspond to the correct key.
Algorithm ended without performing the next substages in
which the correct key should be found. That way we did not
found the number of occurrences of the correct key. That
failure is not based on too less number of analysed pairs,
but it comes from extorted dividing the ﬁrst stage on four
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Table 7
Final results
Number Number Time of substages Time of Time of Number
of all pairs of non-discarded β [s] II stage attack Max of occurrences Result
[million] pairs 1 2 3 4 [s] [s] of correct key
70 20407072 0.2915296 6799 4772 4782 4793 151 21297 124 124 Failure
70 20411849 0.2915978 6847 – – – 31 6878 130 130 Success
70 20412699 0.2916100 6837 – – – 138 6975 133 133 Success
70 20414234 0.2916319 6842 4934 4926 4940 73 21715 145 145 Success
70 20407731 0.2915390 6838 4907 4932 4928 179 21784 131 141 Success
70 20402279 0.2914611 6834 4919 4933 4917 152 21755 124 117 Failure
70 20409520 0.2915646 6841 – – – 233 7074 125 – Failure
70 20407149 0.2915317 6829 – – – 69 6898 156 156 Success
70 20409663 0.2915666 6835 – – – 152 6987 156 156 Success
70 20413565 0.2916224 7030 4776 4896 4812 151 21665 121 115 Failure
70 20412273 0.2916049 6827 4797 4805 – 142 16571 128 128 Success
70 20412370 0.2916053 6867 5002 5014 5015 212 22110 122 122 Failure
70 20405958 0.2915137 8277 5406 5118 4886 41 23728 130 130 Success
70 20412912 0.2916130 4704 – – – 225 4929 139 139 Success
70 20416821 0.2916689 6740 4699 4695 – 163 16297 144 144 Success
70 20406430 0.2915204 6818 4832 4855 4942 152 21599 123 120 Failure
70 20401766 0.2914548 6827 4809 – – 226 11862 149 149 Success
70 20409267 0.2915610 6855 – – – 71 6926 136 136 Success
70 20409910 0.2915701 6832 4808 4837 4819 69 21365 148 148 Success
70 20411009 0.2915858 6830 – – – 205 7035 149 149 Success
70 20406152 0.2915165 6880 – – – 109 6989 138 138 Success
70 20407093 0.2915299 7576 5120 5120 4882 68 22766 144 144 Success
70 20399601 0.2914229 6712 4806 4804 4817 146 21285 130 130 Success
70 20410754 0.2915822 6838 – – – 255 7093 136 136 Success
70 20406290 0.2915184 7796 4959 5184 – 90 18029 133 133 Success
70 20407788 0.29153983 7571 5119 5119 4895 197 22901 152 152 Success
70 20416450 0.29166357 6722 – – – 222 6944 142 142 Success
70 20413332 0.29161903 6840 4937 4929 4943 150 21799 146 146 Success
70 20408688 0.29155269 8576 5337 5115 – 208 19236 141 141 Success
70 20408957 0.29155653 6835 4925 4931 – 244 16935 136 136 Success
70 20408126 0.29154466 6831 4925 4933 4922 220 21831 135 135 Success
70 20407964 0.29154234 6836 4930 4946 4948 46 21706 154 154 Success
70 20408866 0.29155523 6835 4941 – – 31 11807 128 128 Success
Average 0.29156041 6938 4939 4944 4897 146 15599 Succ./fail. 27/6
substages. In that case we should despite to ﬁnd suspect
key in the initial substages continue with next substages.
So the open problem appears: should we always perform
all four substages what will increasing time of the attack
signiﬁcantly or like it was done stop after ﬁnding the ﬁrst
distinct maximum what is faster but generate above fail-
ures?
The way of omitting that problem is ﬁxing a threshold
on the maximum value in the counter. If the found max-
imum is lower than the threshold we will continue with
the next substages. As the performed experiments show
“the level of noise” which is the maximum number of oc-
currences of incorrect key does not exceed 125. However
the correct key usually occurs (if we reached adequate sub-
stage) more often, and even more than 130 times. Hence
we can assume that if we ﬁnd the distinct maximum but
lower than 125 that value does not correspond to the cor-
rect key and we will continue with next substages. The
results of attacks performed with that rule are presented
in Table 7.
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Introducing the threshold almost eliminated the failures,
which comes from dividing problem on substages. Fail-
ures, which appeared now, derive from too small number
of occurrences of the correct key. In those cases we should
generate more pairs to analyse. The exception is the ﬁrst
failure and the failure where the number of occurrences of
the correct key is not given. In the ﬁrst case the maximum
value in the counter corresponded to the correct key but it
did not exceeded the ﬁxed threshold and was not taken in to
account. In that case even without applying the “threshold”
rule attack would end with failure, because found maximum
was not distinct, the second biggest value was only smaller
by 1. In the second case the distinct maximum was found
and it exceeded the threshold but it was not the correct key.
In that case the threshold should be higher. But the higher
threshold may cause more failures of the ﬁrst (previous)
type. Fixing the threshold is very hard and important case.
Increasing the threshold will reduce the number of failures
of second type but will increase the number of failures of
the ﬁrst type and vice versa. However the small number
of total failures in our experiments let us consider that we
ﬁxed the threshold correctly.
The eﬃciency of the attack we can roughly approximate
on 80%, 6 failures in 33 tries, and the average time of
performance of entire attack was 15 600 seconds, which is
about 4 hours and 20 minutes. It is very short time for
recovering full 56-bit key of 9-round algorithm.
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